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It seems clear that a guarantee of the right of employees to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing is a mere delusion if it is not accompanied by the
correlative duty on the part of the other party to recognize such
representatives as they have been designated (whether as
individuals or labor organizations) and to negotiate with them
in a bona fide effort to arrive at a collective bargaining
agreement. Furthermore, the procedure of holding
governmentally supervised elections to determine the choice of
representatives of employees becomes of little worth if after the
election its results are for all practical purposes ignored.
Experience has proved that neither obedience to law nor
respect for law is encouraged by holding forth a right unaccom-
panied by fulfillment. Such a course provokes constant strife,
not peace.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Union density has declined in all countries for years. In the
United States, union density is currently so low that we can foresee
a time when we will refer to U.S. unions only in the past tense.
Thus, the United States now faces a watershed event in the setting
of workplace conditions. This worldwide decline has led many to
examine the value of unions, the character our society would have
without unions, and the wisdom and means of stemming their
decline.2 Popular proposals include minority unions,, changed
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) procedures, and
enhanced labor-management cooperation (LMC). Although each
reform proposal has proponents who passionately advocate its
merits, the discussions are highly speculative because no social
sciences laboratory exists to run experiments on each.
Fortuitously, we can come fairly close to examining the
operation and impact of what has been advanced as a wholly
different way of workplace governance. In 1991, New Zealand
enacted the Employment Contracts Act (ECA), legislation that is
premised on a completely different model than U.S. labor law. It
affords a rich opportunity to study the impact of some key ideas
1. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 2312 (1949).
2. See, e.g., Michael Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the
Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767 (1991); Werner Sengenberger, Intensified Competition,
Industrial Restructuring, and Industrial Relations, 131 INT'L LAB. REV. 139 (1992).
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advanced for labor law reform. The ECA, in effect since. May 15,
1991, is founded on free market principles.3 It rejects the fun-
damentals of the Wagner Act.4 The ECA's novel legislation is
currently being advanced in North America, Europe, and Oceania
as a model for labor law reform. A number of countries are
seriously considering and are likely to enact this legislation.
This Article is part of a series examining many of the novel
legal issues created by the ECA.5 Here, the focus is on how the
ECA affects unions in establishing the right to act as bargaining
representatives and in performing their duties once they have
achieved that status. The comparative approach of this Article
provides insights which we can bring to the discussion of reforming
representation procedures, permitting minority unions, and enhanc-
ing and promoting labor-management cooperation.
II. BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND THE ECA: SOME
INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
When a single worker engages another as an employee this
transforms the first worker into an employer and brings to life
3. Proponents of the ECA are mainly disciples of radical laissez faire ideology who
believe that, "given clearly defined and assigned property rights, unconstrained voluntary
negotiations between private parties produce optimal results." They oppose legislative
interventions into the labor market. Their arguments assume that freely negotiated private
contracts provide efficient solutions to the dual problem of the opportunistic behavior and
future contingencies that inhere in employment relations. Studies show, however, that
market failures do exist and that regulation may produce superior results. Christoph F.
Beuchtmann, Introduction: Employment Security and Labor Markets, in EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES AND
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 3, 55-56 (Christoph F. Beuchtmann ed., 1993) [hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY].
4. In the United States, law professors, whose thoughts on economic matters were
highly influential on ECA proponents, are the most prominent advocates of these
positions. For a discussion of its ideological origins, see Ellen Dannin, We Can't
Overcome: A Case Study of Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform, 16 BERKELEY
J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Dannin, A Case Study]; Ellen Dannin, Labor
Law Reform in New Zealand, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter
Dannin, Labor Law Reform].
5. See Clive Gilson & Ellen Dannin, Getting to Impasse: A Comparison of Impasse
and Unilateral Implementation Under the NLRA and ECA (unpublished paper presented
at the Tenth World Congress, International Industrial Relations Association, Washington,
D.C., May 31 -June 4, 1995); Ellen Dannin, Bargaining Under New Zealand's Employment
Contracts Act: The Problem of Coercion, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. (forthcoming 1996)
[hereinafter Dannin, Bargaining]; Ellen Dannin, Brother, Can You Spare a No-Wage Job:
Labour Law Reform in New Zealand, 10 SOCIALIST REVIEWIREVUE SOCIALISTE-A
CANADIAN ANNUAL (forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter Dannin, Brother].
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issues that are fertile grounds for disputes. Key among these
issues are how to perform the work and reward the worker.
Resolving these matters may involve discord; some would even say
it must cause strife, for they see the employer-employee relation-
ship as one that makes conflict inescapable. Employers will always
want as much control and work for as little pay as possible.
Employees naturally will want autonomy and as much pay as
possible. Thus, an inherent conflict exists in the hierarchy formed
between labor and management. Labor is required to perform
outputs and relinquish its labor power and its determination of the
disposal of surplus to management.6
The now popular opposing view is that conflict is a symptom
of a pathology, of something gone awry in the natural state of
employment relations, which is an association of mutual gains.
7
This conceptualization of employment is a descendant of a line of
thought that has endured since the Middle Ages: hierarchy is part.
of the natural order.8 During the Middle Ages, philosophers
argued that hierarchy functions properly only if all accept their
place as a religious obligation. Each person subordinates in-
dividual desires for immediate pleasure to seek an intangible
reward not available on earth. No one can subvert this natural
order, including the person at the peak of the pyramid. The
6. See, e.g., THOMAS KOCHAN ET' AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 22 (1994). The debates over the ECA raised this issue. The
Service Workers Federation argued that the ECA's predecessor legislation, the Labour
Relations Act (LRA), did not create adversarial relations; rather, conflict pre-existed it,
but the LRA contained and regulated the conflict. Service Workers Federation of
Aotearoa, The Employment Contracts Bill: Submissions of the Service Workers Federation
of Aotearoa 2 (n.d.); see also Michael Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a
Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, in THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESEN-
TATION 57, 69-70 (Matthew Finkin ed., 1994) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION].
7. David Brody, The Breakdown of Labor's Social Contract: Historical Reflections,
Future Prospects, DISSENT, Winter 1992, at 32, 38-39. Not only employers, but
unorganized workers as well, may view conflict in this light. Alan Hyde, Employee
Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, in EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 146, 153. Unorganized workers know the union wants
to raise their conditions to those of organized workers in order to eliminate their
employers' and their own competitive advantage. With personal survival at stake,
employees now see themselves as unavoidably in competition with other workers.
Gottesman, supra note 6, at 63-64. The traditional view, that wages should be taken out
of competition to fight the ratcheting down of working conditions, seems to have been lost,
even though we can see the process of ratcheting down on a global scale.
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, A SHORT DISCOURSE ON THE TYRANNICAL
GOVERNMENT 77-95 (Arthur S. McGrade ed. & John Kilcullen trans., 1992).
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consequences of such an attempt are seen in Shakespeare's King
Lear.9 When the father and king decides to abdicate to his
daughters and heirs, thus upsetting his place in the familial and
social hierarchies, the result is cataclysm and suffering until the
natural order is restored.'" Of interest here, King Lear is a
conflation of the family's hierarchical order with that of work,
which is governance in King Lear. This is fitting, because labor
law evolved from family law as work evolved from a familial to a
social function."
Hierarchy, as conceptualized in medieval and later philosophy,
is an important element of the philosophy of LMC.12 The paral-
lels of thought and analysis, including some religious elements, are
obvious. Proponents of these plans see the interests of employer
and employee as naturally unitary and inevitably beneficial to
both, as long as the parties are educated to understand and not to
resist the essential nature of the relationship. 3 LMC supporters
say, "As well as conflict, there is also cooperation, for
managements need workers' compliance, while workers depend on
employers for their jobs and cannot afford to adopt a policy of
total resistance . ...,"" LMC often is promoted as a means of
increasing productivity, which has obvious benefits for everyone in
the workplace. 5 Thus, both parties cooperate for their mutual
9. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR.
10. Id.
11. See Thomas Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION,
supra note 6, at 224, 229.
12. Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation: Competing Visions and Labor's
Challenge, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 233, 262-65 (1990). Another way of conceptualizing the
issue is that the default position in the workplace is employer control and worker
deference. A very different way to think about labor law would be to have a system in
which unionization or worker control would be the default position.
13. Insight into this connection is not a new idea even in this decade. In the 1920's
and 1930's company unions debated in these very terms. See Patricia Greenfield & Robert
Pleasure, Representatives of Their Own Choosing: Finding Workers' Voice in the Legitimacy
and Power of Their Unions, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 169, 181-89 (Bruce Kaufman et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter FUTURE
DIRECTIONS]. For collected citations of such sentiments, see Mark Barenberg, Democracy
and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible
Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 808-12 (1994).
14. P.K. Edwards et al., Introduction: The Workplace and Labor Regulation in
Comparative Perspective, in WORKPLACE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE GLOBAL
CHALLENGE 3, 7 (Jacques Belanger et al. eds., 1994).
15. For an overview of various conceptions of LMC, see McLeod, supra note 12, at
233; Cynthia Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the
National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEx. L. REV. 921, 961-62 (1993). Under the Wagner
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benefit.16 Faith, a theological element in the medieval iteration
of this idea, is now an ideological certainty in the innate value of
freedom of the market and of contract as ultimate rewards for
those who pursue the virtuous path. Thus, there need not, and
may not, be immediate reward for furthering these goals; there
may even be pain instead of gain. This hierarchy's value is
justified by its essential rightness. In other words, it is a matter of
faith. 7
Issues of the workplace's nature and the role unions play in
it are captured by the debate between advocates and opponents of
LMC.'8 Critics argue that LMC is nothing more than a covert,
model, improved labor relations will promote employers' needs by creating a more stable
and productive workforce and a strong economy through the greater purchasing power of
the workers. KOCHAN, supra note 6, at 26.
16. An interesting cautionary note on the assumptions that inform these schemes is
found in Maryellen Kelly & Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-
Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 247 (Larry
Mishel & Paula Voos eds., 1992), which found that LMC schemes, in the absence of
unions, had many consequences that employers regard as adverse, including lowering
productivity. Barenberg, supra note 13, at 959-60.
17. See., e.g., Guy Molyneux, Conservatives: Are They Now Softheaded?, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1993, at M2. Those who doubt this element of the free market philosophy should
read news reports and discussions of the austerity plans imposed in Third World countries
and in countries moving from more controlled markets to capitalism. They are replete
with quasi-theological statements touting the need to move through pain to achieve the
goal of freedom. They persist as dominant world views, even though there is admitted
wreckage left as a result of their implementation.
World Bank official Geoffrey Sheperd describe[d] New Zealand as 'intellectually
a complete and a logical model', [although] he readily admits that the World
Bank has conducted no study of New Zealand's reforms. So those who are
looking for a well-studied, well-evidenced example should be careful about
invoking New Zealand. It is important to distinguish between ideological
preference and careful, rigorous evaluation.
Ngaire Woods, Analysis: Shrinking the State (BBC radio broadcast, July 13, 1995). This
ideology and faith were also present among ECA proponents. Cf. Interview with Anne
Knowles, Labor Market Manager, New Zealand Employers Federation, in Wellington,
N.Z. (May 21, 1992).
18. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power,
Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1993); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
575 (1992). At times this debate is expressed crudely as the adversarial system embodied
in the Wagner Act versus cooperative schemes. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 7, at 171 n.76.
Even a superficial reading of § 1 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or the
NLRA debates, however, shows that the Act was designed to promote cooperation in
resolving disputes. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 146; Recommendations
of Professor Charles J. Morris to the Commission on the future of Worker-Management
Relations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at D25 (Jan. 10, 1994). The NLRA's insight was
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insidious, and highly effective means of asserting dominance and
control in the workplace. 19
New Zealanders who promoted the ECA, primarily the New
Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) and the New Zealand
Business Roundtable (NZBR), grounded their philosophy in the
unitary nature of the workplace. The NZEF argued, for example,
that the highest priority for workers and employers was the
viability of the enterprise." To unitarists,. workplace conflict is
a sign that the parties are unable to see their mutuality or that
some outside force has blinded them to it.21 Unitarists see unions
as the outside force most likely to create conflict and thus, destroy
productivity in the workplace.2  The New Zealand Service
Workers Federation noted, "The myth is expressed most vividly,
and in almost sexual terms by the Employers Federation: without
the interference of unions, the employee/employer 'relationship
would likely become mature and be consummated.' ,23
that cooperation can only exist between equals and that employers organized in the cor-
porate form cannot meet as equals with individual employees. Thus, there can be no
useful or meaningful cooperation between the two. See Barenberg, supra note 13, at 795-
96. In other words, its drafters designed the NLRA to be the original LMC plan. See
STEVEN M. FETTER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION, SECOND INTERIM REPORT 39 (1987).
19. Both are only examples of other explanations for how employers and employees
interact, how they deal with conflict, and how they establish order. Each theory of the
workplace assigns roles to unions, with most traditionally seeing unions as the represen-
tative, protector, and collective voice of the workers.
20. See Anne Knowles, Four Months down the Track: Is the Employment Contracts Act
,Working?, EXAMINER, Sept. 5, 1991, at 19; Electricity Corporation, Submission to the
Labour Select Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 10 (Feb. 1991). A similar
view was expressed by employers during debates for the NLRA. Barenberg, supra note
18, at 1460.
21. DEBORAH CODDINGTON, TURNING PAIN INTO GAIN 164-76 (1993).
22. The New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) submission on the ECA argued
that the existing system had ritualized and institutionalized the supposed conflict that
existed between employers and workers. New Zealand Business Roundtable, Submission
to the Labour Select Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 1 (1991). A virtually
identical view was advanced during hearings for the NLRA. Barenberg, supra note 18, at
1460 n.350.
23. Service Workers Federation of Aotearoa, supra note 6, at 2 (citation omitted).
Over the past two decades, New Zealand has suffered tremendously from changes in its
foreign trade. Around the world, identification of worker with employer has been, in part,
a product of global forces that have opened national markets by removing protections, as
well as a worldwide rise in unemployment rates. As Michael Gottesman observes:
The fear that grips most workers today is not that they will be fired or
permanently replaced, but that their jobs will disappear. They worry that their
employer will lose out in the competitive world and go under, or that the
investors will move their capital (and thus the jobs) to another locale (perhaps
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
The ECA is an incarnation of the unitary workplace. It shares
insights and arguments advanced by proponents of LMC.24 As
with other unitarists, including many proponents of LMC, the
ECA accepts that intrusions into the employer-employee relation-
ship, such as unions, are destructive or, at best, unnecessary. In
1989, Penelope Brook, an advocate of the ECA, asked her readers
.to imagine a less directive labor system and one based more on.
"defining and enforcing property rights in labour and maintaining
a law of contract"25 than one which was more directive, that is,
one which specified "how workers may organise, who may be party
to employment negotiations and how they may enforce the results
of their negotiations."26  The system "would be facilitative,
seeking only to establish such rights and systems of contractual law
as would enable employees and employers to determine the nature
of their relationship in the most mutually beneficial way."2
Issues such as efficiency in bargaining and establishing workplace
terms would be the basis for a decision to unionize.2"
In November 1990, just before the National Party introduced
the draft ECA, the NZEF issued The Benefits of Bargaining
Reform. The NZEF said their publication was designed "to
change employer attitudes so that they would take full advantage
of the menu of opportunities the National Party [was] offering
them."29 The publication enumerated NZEF goals for industrial
another country) whose lower wage scales enable more effective competition.
Having absorbed this message, workers today have become persuaded that the
key to the survival of their jobs is that their employer be an effective com-
petitor-including, if necessary, a competitor based on lower labor costs.
Gottesman, supra note 6, at 63. The fear and uncertainty that flow from these massive
changes prompt workers and governments to abandon old values, which they blame for
their woes, and seek new ways of ordering society. This captures much of what has
happened in New Zealand.
24. For a U.S. example of an advocate who joins these threads, see. Samuel Estreicher,
Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening up the Possibilities for Value-Added
Unionism, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 95, at El (May 17, 1995) [hereinafter Estreicher,
Labor Law Reform]; Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law
Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at E-10 (June 5, 1995) [hereinafter Estreicher,
Dunlop Report].
.25. Penelope Brook, Reform of the Labour Market, in ROGERNOMICS: RESHAPING
NEW ZEALAND'S ECONOMY 182, 193 (Simon Walker ed., 1989).
26. Id. Professor Estreicher currently advocates a position close to Brook's in the
United States. See Estreicher, Labor Law Reform, supra note 24, at E-1.
27. Brook, supra note 25, at 193.
28. Id. at 193-95.
29. Patricia Herbert, Employers' Federation Almost Outdoes Itself, DOMINION, Nov.
26, 1990, at 10.
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relations in a short essay entitled "The Vision-An Ideal Or-
ganisation" and contrasted the Ideal with Reality.3"
In the Ideal, a successful company completes an annual update
of its five-year strategic plan. "[E]ach employee is committed to
a set of operational and. personal objectives, through participation
in the planning process."3  The workers are self-managing,
individually fulfilled, problem-solving team workers who work
through "[s]taff associations, [which] where they exist are strong
and loyal" and facilitate the sensitive and rapid defusing of
controversy to obtain mutually satisfactory results.32 Management
provides information freely and regularly and shares profits with
the workers, "after capital retention and dividend decisions have
been made."33
Reality has organizations controlled by "[p]ower, secret
information, unpublished agendas, [and] prejudices."34 These or-
ganizations are rule-bound and inflexible. "Employees display all
the expressions of low self esteem, lethargy and hostility., 35 In
Reality, life is grim: "Innovation is suspect. Quality is the preserve
of the quality control manager. Service means servitude. Going
the extra step can be tantamount to betrayal of one's colleagues,
an Uncle Tom of the industrial system."36
Unions in Reality harm workers by being the only conduit for
communication and by communicating only about wage demands,
grievances, or "an alleged infringement of long-held rights; usually
trivial and rarely an expression of concern about improving the
performance of the company, or the long term futures of the
employees' jobs and livelihood."'37 Collective bargaining results
in setting conditions that are irrelevant to the state of the par-
ticular employer. "There is no concept of 'win/win'., 38 Unions
act in ways detrimental to the enterprise and to their members by
being solely motivated by a desire to retain control. Otherwise,
bargaining freedom would be "the first step in which workers and
30. NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYERS FEDERATION, The Vision-An Ideal Organisation,
in THE BENEFITS OF BARGAINING REFORM 3-4 at 3 (1990).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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employers decide their own destiny. That success would highlight
the superfluous nature of union involvement."39
According to the NZEF, abolishing the "paternalistic and
outmoded" Labour Relations Act (LRA) would usher in a new
world in which "[u]nions and their captive audiences would be
forced into the world of reality, and employers would be foolish
not to communicate that reality. Ultimately, employer and
employee would resolve their differences and bargaining would
take on a very different aspect."'  Communication would
improve "because wage bargaining is a natural forum on which to
build communication.",
41
The Benefits of Bargaining Reform says unions are
"superfluous. 4 2 Many NZEF publications argue that unions are
either unnecessary or have evil motives that lead them to cause
conflict in the workplace. Anne Knowles, Labour Market
Manager for the New Zealand Employers Federation, wrote, "[I]t
is the equally firmly held view of proponents of the [ECA]... that
divisions that have been created in the workplace by outside
constraints imposed by current legislation will be removed,
allowing the employer and employees at an enterprise to have full
and open communication.
43
The ECA's drafters tried to redesign unions, because they
believed that unions are unnecessary and even destructive to the
workplace. This might lead one to conclude that the ECA's sole
purpose is to destroy unions and lower wages.' The drastic
decline in union density and union membership since the
enactment of the ECA does nothing to allay such concerns. New
Zealand's twenty-three percent union density in December 1994
was a drop of approximately forty percent from its pre-ECA figure
of sixty-five percent in May 1991. In the same period, union
39. Id.
40. Id. at 9.
41. Id. For a different view of the nature of such bargaining, see RICHARD EDWARDS,
RIGHTS AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE POST-UNION ERA 50-53 (1993).
42. Herbert, supra note 29, at 10.
43. Anne K. Knowles, Employment Contracts Bill: What's In It For the Workers?
EXAMINER, Apr. 24, 1991, at 7. Along the same lines, Electricity Corporation contended:
"The aims and objectives of many unions so endowed with exclusive bargaining rights
frequently bears little relationship to the real needs of an employer and his or her staff."
Electricity Corporation, supra note 20, at 5.
44. See JOHN DEEKS ET AL., LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN NEW
ZEALAND 511 (2d ed. 1994).
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membership plunged from 603,118 to 375,906, a drop of ap-
proximately thirty-eight percent.45 Such a decline has no known
parallel in any country during peacetime. Indeed, Raymond
Harbridge and Anthony Honeybone describe the situation in New
Zealand as the "collapse of collective bargaining.,4 6  Further-
more, some studies of this period showed that unions were
involved in a minority of negotiations.
4 7
Although these statistics do not dispel the belief that the ECA
is anti-union, such a conception of the ECA does nothing to
explain how the ECA has facilitated this decline. Furthermore, it
misses essential truths about the ECA. Nowhere in the ECA are
there any prohibitions on union activity. If anything, its language
and operation appear scrupulously evenhanded. If it talks of any
goals, they are those of freedom, self-actualization, and produc-
tivity. Overt anti-unionism does not explain the ECA's impact; its
dominant philosophies are freedom of contract, neoclassical
economics, and equality of employers and employees. The ECA
implements these by instituting an evenhanded treatment based on
the premise that employee and employer can negotiate fairly,
productively, and as equals.
If philosophies of fairness, freedom, and equality have caused
a decline in New Zealand's unions, more serious problems arise.
We are forced to focus on uncomfortable questions: How do
freedom and equality denigrate the existence of unions? Are the
ECA proponents correct in arguing that unions are antithetical to
important values in our societies? If so, the public relations task
alone is enormous. The answer, evident after an examination of
the ECA and the way it has operated during its first few years, is
that it is the way in which the ECA understands and promotes
equality and freedom which are, for unions, the most destructive
aspects of the ECA.
45. Raymond Harbridge et al., Unions and Union Membership, in New Zealand:
Annual Review for 1993, 19 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 175, 176 (1994); Raymond Harbridge &
Kevin Hince, Unions and Union Membership, in New Zealand 1985-1992, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS.
REL. 352, 355 (1993).
46. Raymond Harbridge & Anthony Honeybone, The Employment Contracts Act and
Collective Bargaining Patterns: A Review of the 1993/1994 Year, in EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACrS: BARGAINING TRENDS & EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE: 1993/94, at 1, 3
(Raymond Harbridge et al. eds., 1994).
47. DEEKS, supra note 44, at 520-21.
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Examining how these goals play themselves out provides a
much more interesting and useful understanding because it permits
extrapolation beyond New Zealand's specific situation. As
legislation intended solely to promote freedom of contract and a
free labor market, the ECA has a profoundly detrimental impact
on unions. If it has this impact, even though not intended to be
anti-union, this suggests that these ideologies may be seriously
flawed as foundations for labor laws. This impact leads to
questioning the nature of the freedom espoused and whether
unions play a sufficiently valuable role that the law should support
their existence. Other countries are considering enacting their own
ECAs and not necessarily for anti-union reasons. Thus, an
analysis that focuses on how freedom of contract and the market
perform as a basis for labor contracting is likely to be widely
useful.
This Article presents cases, not to produce a treatise on the
current state of the law as it pertains to bargaining representatives,
but rather to explore the ways that New Zealand's courts have
interpreted the ECA and to extrapolate from these decisions
information as to what makes functional or dysfunctional law in
this area. Thus, even cases that have since been overruled are
useful to this analysis.48
III. BASICS OF REPRESENTATION UNDER THE ECA
When the ECA came before New Zealand's Parliament, new
Labour Party Member of Parliament Jim Anderton proposed the
following amendment:
Where an employee is a member of an employees'
organisation, and the rules of that organisation provide that
membership of that organisation shall authorise the organisation
to represent its members in negotiations, such membership shall
48. Many of the issues and cases discussed here were also the focus of attention and
concern of the International Labour Office's (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association
and formed the basis for its finding that the ECA is at variance with ILO principles. See
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 295TH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION, Case No. 1698 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter ILO REPORT]. The ECA is so
different from most labor relations statutes that talking about it accurately and trying to
describe its operation requires care and precision. This is particularly the case in
discussing representation authorizations and union representation of members. Being
conscious of these and giving them proper weight and place is not an easy task.
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prima facie be evidence of the authority of that organisation to
represent that employee.4 9
Within most labor relations systems this amendment would be
unnecessary because they view the act of membership as being so
inextricably intertwined with representation that the existence of
one presupposes the other. The ECA does not permit this
automatic connection and assumption. No one could have thought
that the ECA inadvertently disconnected the two after Anderton's
defeated attempt to reintegrate membership and representation.5"
Union membership and representation under the ECA is akin to
viewing a film frame by frame. Although each frame shows
reality, the single frame is so out of context as to be unintel-
ligible.51
By defeating the amendment, ECA proponents opted to
disaggregate every aspect of membership and representation.
What is elsewhere a single act of joining and then being
represented by a union in bargaining, grievance processing, and
legal actions is a diffused and complex process in New Zealand.
Union membership does not automatically mean union represen-
tation. Indeed, unions could not even condition membership on
employees' agreeing to link the two. 2 As a consequence, union
49. PARL. DEB. (Hansard) 1580 (Apr. 30, 1991) (N.Z.). Labour Party member Larry
Sutherland proposed a similar amendment. Id. at 1582.
50. Id. at 1582-88, 1589.
51. An interesting literary analogy is MARTIN AMIS, TIME'S ARROW (1993), a novel
about a Nazi doctor told in reverse chronology. Instead of being a mass murderer, he
becomes a person who has helped create a people from ashes and smoke.
52. The Dairy Workers' Union unsuccessfully attempted to link the two by requiring
broad authorization as a condition of membership. The Employment Court commented:
Employees are free to choose their bargaining representatives. It is contrary
to the philosophy of the legislation for an association of employees (a union) or
anyone else to seek to restrict them in that choice by requiring such employees
td accept the union as their bargaining agent as a necessary consequence of
membership .... Across the spectrum of unions it is now well recognised that
employees may be union members and may remain so but without having given
a bargaining authority or having withdrawn or revoked the same. Although
negotiation of employment contracts is a clearly important function of a union,
benefits such as representation in disputes, in personal grievances and actions for
the recovery of wages underpaid are simply some common examples of the range
of benefits available to employees because of union membership in circumstances
where they may wish either to bargain individually or collectively for themselves
or to have another representative do so. In its rejection of the applications for
* union membership of Hautapu employees other than those where full bargaining
and other representative authority was given, the union acted wrongly.
N.Z. Dairy Workers Union, Inc. v. Hautapu Whey Transp., [19941 2 E.R.N.Z. 549, 570
(1994).
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representation in bargaining does not automatically allow .the
union to advance the cause of those for whom it bargains,
including taking strike action. Negotiating a contract does not
mean a union can sue to enforce contract violations or to protect
its members. Each step is conditioned on proof that the principal
has authorized its representative to perform the act.53
This Article explores primarily three areas in which disag-
gregation creates special difficulties. Disaggregation: (1) enlarges
employers' scope to oppose employees' authorization of union
representation; (2) permits employers to refuse to bargain with an
authorized bargaining representative; and (3) allows employers to
use the authorization requirement as a procedural hurdle to foil
union effectiveness in bargaining and in prosecuting violations of
the ECA and suits for breach of contract. Each of these difficul-
ties makes unions incrementally less effective and thus less
attractive to potential members.
A. Employer Opposition to Union Authorization
1. Some Basics on ECA Treatment of Bargaining
Representatives
The ECA evenhandedly permits an employee or an employer
to select a representative to negotiate and enforce employment
contracts or prosecute statutory violations.54 The other party
then must "recognise the authority of that person, group, or or-
ganisation to represent the employee or employer in those
negotiations."55 ECA proponents theorized that authorization
53. The ECA provides that anyone who purports "in negotiations for an employment
contract, to represent any employee or employer shall establish the authority of that
person, group, or organisation to represent that employee or employer in' those
negotiations." Employment Contracts Act [ECA] § 12(1) (1991) (N.Z.). Section 12(2)
provides that once such authorization is given, the bargaining partner "shall ... recognise
the authority" to represent. Id. § 12(2). The ECA requires no more than to recognize the
authority. Rick Barker, Service Workers Federation, explained that "the law is the
employer has to recognize the union, recognition is like walking down the street, and I
recognize a friend and you just have to say hello and that is the end of it. It doesn't mean
that you have to do anymore about it." Interview with Rick Barker, National Secretary,
Service Workers Federation of Aotearoa, in Wellington, N.Z. (May 14, 1992).
54. ECA § 10.
55. Id. § 12(2). For a U.S. advocate of a similar system, see Timothy McConville,
Monopoly Unionism Under the National Labor Relations Act: An Abrogation of Common
Law Agency Doctrine, 46 LAB. L.J. 469-(1995).
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would take place after the principal conducted a businesslike
analysis. As Penelope Brook describes it,
[this] decision to delegate bargaining to an agent, whether by
employers, by employees or by both, will similarly depend on
an analysis of costs and benefits. The benefits associated with
the use of specialists to process information and carry out
negotiations will be set against the costs of an agent failing to
represent the true interests of his or her party. The balance
may be tipped in favour of unionism if the unions are able to
supply other services, such as education, pension schemes or
medical centres.
56
This description fails to appreciate and account for significant
differences in the situations of employees and employers. 57 The
ECA assumes that human beings are the same as corporate
individuals. 8 Thus, if this assumption is inaccurate, it will skew
the operation of the ECA.
Humans and corporations differ in fundamental ways. As a
matter of law, employers organized as corporations or partnerships
are collective entities. In addition, corporations are only fictional
persons who cannot function except through representatives. If
they want to speak, they do so through designated parts of their
corporate anatomy. They must designate parts of their collectivity
to interact with the world. Equally important, the law does not
require corporations to have consciences or to learn the basics of
cause and effect. The law limits corporate liability and permits
those who make decisions for the corporation to escape personal
consequences. Each of these aspects of corporate existence would
take place whether the ECA existed or not; however the structure
of the ECA and corporations fit well together.
Employees may work together, but they face obstacles to
collectivity. When workers take collective action, it appears that
56., Brook, supra note 25, at 194.
57. Martha Minow raises similar problems in the context of discrimination and anti-
discrimination efforts. Laws that apply equally to all persons but which fail to account for
relevant differences may not be equal in impact or effect. See generally MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990);
ROBERT MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1991).
58. This conflation of individuals and corporations is common among adherents to
neo-classical economics. This "ignores a vast literature in history, sociology, and other
disciplines that shows beyond doubt that organizations do not usually behave as individuals
do and that groups of varying sizes have different patterns of behavior." Thomas McCraw,
The Trouble with Adam.Smith, AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1992, at 353, 371.
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they do so only to further their personal ends. Worse, worker
collectivity is a usurpation of workplace hierarchy. It cuts against
ingrained attitudes of obedience and workers' incorporation into,
and interest in, the employer's well being. Workers experience
many forces that make it easier to remain individuals. Additional-
ly, workers are neither fictional nor collective persons. Their
individual existence continues whether or not they unite. Further-
more, they can only speak collectively by being willing to stifle
their individual voices. Workers have consciences and can learn
cause and effect. They are keenly aware that organization may
have unpleasant consequences and may leave them without the
means to support their families.
Appointing a representative is thus as unnatural a way for
people to interact with the world and to cope with the pressures
of the workplace as it is natural for a corporation. Nothing
requires or fosters collectivity for employees in a way comparable
to corporation law. All these distinctions are significant in their
impact on the parties under ECA coverage. As the Public Service
Association (PSA) representative Joris de Bres explained of the
ECA:
[A]ny collective democratic decision is broken down into
individual choice. It sounds attractive, but at the beginning of
the process of bargaining it breaks people up. They have to
determine to come back together. Once they've determined to
come back together there is actually a collection of individual
choices to be individually represented together and any of them
can pull out of that again. It makes it very difficult for a union
to have a role on a more mature basis in terms of people
accepting majority decisions and then entering into bargains or
agreements with the employer. Because it's always actually no
more than a collection of individuals. The law now defines each
worker as an individual.59
The ECA does not acknowledge differences in the way
employers and employees make use of the legislation's provisions.
This ignores different reactions that the two are likely to have to
the other's representative. The ECA provides that a union (as
employee representative) or an employer's representative can act
only if the agent provides authorization satisfactory to the other
59. Interview with Joris de Bres, Central Operations Manager of the PSA, in
Wellington, N.Z. (May 7, 1992).
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party.' This literal equality fosters actual inequality, for
employer authorization is profoundly different from an employee's
authorization.
An employer who separates a union representative from its
principal strengthens its hand in bargaining. An anti-union
employer may decide to separate the two simply because it dislikes
unions and suffers no ill consequences from not acceding to the
union's authorization. Employers also have the ability to persuade
employees to withdraw authorization. An employee has no
corresponding incentive to thwart the employer's choice of
representative. Employees usually want bargaining to proceed and
recognize that this can only happen through an employer
spokesperson. With few exceptions, separating an employer from
its spokesperson does not benefit employees. Even if employees
wished to separate an employer from its representative, they lack
the means to do so.6 Thus, authorization requirements have
vastly different consequences for employers and employees.
2. Union Access to Employees
The LRA, the legislation preceding the ECA, allowed unions
to enter an employer's premises to recruit and interview potential
members or. to collect fees or other charges. Refusing entry
carried a fine of up to $1000.62 The LRA also mandated two
paid two-hour "stopwork" meetings a year.63 The ECA does not
permit such free access. It gives "a person, group, or organisation
seeking to represent any employee or employees in
negotiations" access to seek authorizations, but only with employer
approval.' Authorized representatives also have access to
60. ECA §§ 12, 13. The burden of proving this authorization is on the agent. ECA
§§ 12, 59.
61. Not only are they unlikely to refuse to bargain, in the ECA environment at least
one union was willing to negotiate with a representative who had not been authorized by
any employer as a representative. The union hoped this would induce employers to
recognize and negotiate with it. The New Zealand Dairy Industry Employers Association
negotiated with its corresponding union for a successor to its award and then, when it had
reached an agreement on the terms of the contract, it sought bargaining and ratification
authority from employers who had been parties to the award. N.Z. Dairy Workers Union,
Inc. v. Hautapu Whey Transp., [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 549, 555 (1994).
62. Labor Relations Act [LRA] § 56 (1987) (N.Z.).
63. Id. § 57.
64. ECA § 13.
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employees to prepare for negotiations.65 The Employment Court
has held that an employer may not deny or delay access during an
employee's nonworking time or add additional conditions as a way
to deny access. 66  Access for other purposes is no longer a
statutory right but can be negotiated in a contract or permitted by
an employer.67
Under the ECA, unions can achieve access for most purposes
only by making concessions during negotiations. U.S. unionists
might easily dismiss the change to the less supportive ECA as
unimportant because they have always had to organize without
legislated access. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited
rights of access that the NLRB believed necessary to protect
employees' section 7 rights.68
Organizers who for decades had legally mandated access,
however, would feel the ECA's impact more harshly. Generations
of New Zealand organizers abruptly entered the ECA era without
the necessary organizing strategies. Attorney Robyn Haultain
explained the impact this change had on unions:.
One of the reasons that it was hard for our union and lots
of other unions to respond, I think, was that for the previous 15
odd years, the unions had fairly much unrestricted access to
workplaces and this tradition of running union meetings in the
employers' time, when the workers were getting paid, was really
well established and so it was very easy to get people to come
to a union meeting when they get off the job for an hour and
get paid for it. Great. Everybody loved it and rushed along to
the meeting, even if they are not interested in the description of
the meeting or the outcome.
69
65. Id. § 14(1).
66. National Distribution Union, Inc. v. Foodstuffs (Auckland), Ltd., [1994] 1 E.R.N.Z.
653, 660 (1994).
67. Employers also can voluntarily grant access. Organizer Maxine Gay described
being allowed to enter a law office to re-sign former clerical members just after the ECA
went into effect:
I returned there and held meetings to seek to represent the workers for a
collective employment contract, and the bosses were quite happy to let them go
on because they really thought that I was going to be booted out. I came out of
there with 27 members, including some staff solicitors who really knew that they
were going to get done over.
Interview with Maxine Gay, PSA Organizer, in Palmerston North, N.Z. (May 17, 1992):
68. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 317
N.L.R.B. No. 100 (May 31, 1995).
69: Interview with Robyn Haultain, Attorney, in Wellington, N.Z. (May 19, 1992).
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If all reduced access did was to force organizers to learn new
skills, it would not be a serious problem. The problem, however,
is how this issue of access ties in with the parts of the ECA. First,
although employees have given a union authorization to represent
them, the law allows the employer to decide unilaterally if the
authorization is satisfactory and thus gives the absolute right to
permit or deny access. Second, the ECA focuses only on represen-
tation and negotiation. As a result, it considers access necessary
only for the purposes of seeking authorizations to represent or,
once those are given, to negotiate.
In other words, the ECA does not recognize the importance
of activities which elsewhere form a key part of the collective
bargaining relationship, such as policing the agreement and
ascertaining members' current conditions.7" Unions act "as
workers' collective monitor of managerial behavior.... The union
has a greater capacity than either individual workers or company
union representatives to assess managerial honesty because it can
draw on information about the behavior not only of the immediate
employer, but of comparably situated employers."'" The ECA
also does not envision as important the cultivation of relationships
between unions and their members as a means of assuring workers
of their union's ongoing concern, protection, and accessibility or of
.demonstrating their presence to the employer. The importance of
access as a means of cultivating and maintaining union-worker
relationships was underscored when, just after the ECA became
effective, major unions lost important worksites precisely because
employees there became convinced that they could not rely on
absentee unions.
72
It might-appear that New Zealand unions are still better off
than U.S. unions, because they have some legislated rights of
access. In the United States, even though unions generally have
no right of access to organize employees, enforce the agreement
or represent their members, absent an agreement with the
70. Although none have chosen to do so, a liberal interpretation a New Zealand court
could apply is to allow access to do these things because a union would need to ascertain
current conditions, even when a contract is in place, in order to prepare to negotiate with
its successor.
71. Barenberg, supra note 18, at 1470.
72. One reason the union lost in Alliance was that, when the employer cut workers'
pay, the union wasn't visiting regularly enough to learn what had happened. Interview
with Robyn Haultain, supra note 69.
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employer, they nonetheless may gain the equivalent through
information requests.7 3 - Furthermore, once U.S. unions achieve
access rights in a collective bargaining agreement, they are better
able to enforce those rights, because the agreement is between the
employer and the union. Under the ECA, a union denied access
might not learn that it needs to take action. If a violation occurs,
the union is not present in the workplace to help employees stiffen
their resolve. It might have to resort to legal process to gain
access. This patent lack of power-makes it less likely individual
employees would come forward to assert their rights. Workers are
less likely to trust their fates to a representative who cannot
demonstrate his competence and ability to promote their
interests.
74
All these barriers to effective representation resulted from the
ECA's limited focus on gaining authorizations and negotiations for
a contract as the sole purposes of representation. It fails to
support unions in all areas in which representation could be
meaningful. The ECA fails to comprehend the ongoing nature of
the employment relationship and the need for a representative
once a contract is negotiated. By further failing to comprehend
the need for access to the workplace during the contract term, the
ECA fails to meet the needs of workers seeking to bargain under
its disaggregated representational system.
3. Union Party Status
The ECA presumes the natural parties to any employment
agreement to be the employer and the employee. No one else
may become a party to the contract without the parties' assent.75
It is easy to see how this flows from a belief in the unitary
workplace. Here again, the ECA treats employer and employee
representatives equally. If the workplace is not unitary or if
employees and employers are not equal, limiting party status will
have unequal effects.
73. Unions are entitled to information that is relevant to the performance of their
representational duties. If. an employer withholds or fails to timely provide such
information, the employer may be in violation of § 8(a)(5). NLRA § 8(a)(5); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5)., See Acme Industrial Co. v. NLRB, 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
74. Gottesman, supra note 6, at 66.
75. ECA § 17.
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Employer representatives do not need to be parties to a
contract because the law provides reasonable substitutes. A union
needs party status because, as a fragile, collective body, it has an
ineradicable split in identity from the persons it represents. This
presents a serious burden that nonparty unions must overcome if
they are to protect their members and the bargain they have
struck. Thus, lack of party status is not a symbolic issue. Without
party status and without according meaning to unions with party
status, unions are unable to take effective action. The Wagner
system, in contrast, assumes the collective bargaining agreement is
between the employer and union. Employees are. beneficiaries
rather than parties to the agreement.
If party status is not automatic for the union-negotiator, the
union must persuade the employer to agree to party status and,
conceivably, must make concessions to secure it. Enticing an
employer to make such an agreement clearly is not easy. The
NZEF, the major employer umbrella group in New Zealand, ad-
vised its advocates (negotiators) to refuse unions party status.76
For the period 1993 to 1994, only fifty-two percent of contracts
named unions as parties. This bare majority indicates greater
success for this strategy than it might otherwise suggest, for it
represents a range of from two percent coverage in the restaurant
and hotel industries to a seventy-five percent coverage in com-
munity and public services, with most industries clustering about
thirty-five to forty-five percent.77 Without the very large public
sector, the fifty-two percent figure would shrink to as low as one-
third. In the private sector, the majority of employers deny union
party status.
76. During the ECA debates, the New Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF)
advocated excluding any agent, not just unions, from being a party to an employment
contract. New Zealand Employers Federation, Employment Contracts Bill 1991:
Submission at A-3 (Jan. 30, 1991).
The key thing was-the Employers Federation decided one of the most
appropriate strategies for employers was to deny the unions party status to any
agreements. And it has been quite an incredible happening for us that they are
willing to negotiate with the union, but do not want to accede to party status to
any agreements as one way of deferring to the Employers Federation, to say,
look, we haven't noticed a demand. But to also be able to keep faith with what
they view as being as a philosophy of being pro-worker and reasonably pro-
union.
Interview with Rick Barker, supra note 53.
77. Harbridge & Honeybone, supra note 46, at 25.
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Assuming a-union held its forces together and consummated
a contract, with or without party status, authorization to represent
employees collectively in bargaining does not change the fact that
the contract is between the employer and employee. Each
employee who wanted the contract's coverage still must sign the
contract. Rick Barker explained:
See what people get is the misimpression is [sic] that
collective bargaining presupposes collective contracts. Well,
they are not collective contracts in the sense that you would
believe in internationally or in an American sense. They are,
in effect, individual contracts which happen to coincide with
other individuals and so the individuals all came in, put their
pen to the paper on the same document. We have a number of
contracts that we have signed as an organization on behalf of
those who we represent and what we have to supply to the
employers is a list of names and a copy of the authorization
they have signed with us to make us the agent, so it is ad-
ministratively very complicated and is almost as difficult as you
can get.7"
The ECA's failure to provide unions automatic party status
was one ground for concern that the International Labour Office's
(ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association's Final Report
identified when it investigated complaints filed concerning the
ECA.79
4. Withdrawal of Authorizations
According to its drafters, achieving the ECA's stated end of
promoting an efficient labor market meant allowing "employees to
determine who should represent their interests in relation to
employment issues."' More specifically, an object of the ECA
78. Interview with Rick Barker, supra note 53. The level of formality Barker describes
may not be the case for most workers. A survey of students found that nearly half did not
know what sort of contract they had and five percent said they had none. Debbie
Peterson, Secondary School Students in Paid Work 1994, in LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND
WORK IN NEW ZEALAND 1994, at 189, 193 (Philip S. Morrison ed., 1994). Perhaps the
respondents did not know what sort of contract they had because there had been no
recognizable contracting activity. Indeed, the study found that 51% had no input
regarding their work terms. Id. In any case, the students' lack of awareness had risen by
ten percent over a similar survey conducted two years earlier. Id. at 194. Other studies
corroborate these figures. See Dannin, A Case Study, supra note 4.
79. ILO REPORT, supra note 48, para. 258.
80. Employment Contracts Bill (Long Title of the ECA) (c)(ii).
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was "to establish that... [e]mployees have the freedom to choose
whether or not to associate with other employees for the purpose
of advancing the employees' collective interests."'" Freedom,
self-determination, and individual choice are all ihaportant, even
unassailable values. Again, however, these values operate
differently within union and employer contexts. Corporate law
operates as a barrier to the corporation's easy dissolution. In
other words, for corporations-the very bodies that actually are
engaged in market transactions-the law recognizes that values
other than absolute freedom may be paramount in certain
settings." To function effectively, unions require some limits that
protect their organizational lives. In the case of unions, the ECA
recognizes no values that are more important than freedom.
In many ways, the problem is rooted in the analogy used to
define the nature of a union's relationship with its members.
Although the ECA sees unions as outsiders, it allows them to exist
if a party considers them to be providing a worthwhile service. As
long as unions are no more than a means of delivering a service,
they can be selected or discarded when the buyers of the service
(employees) conclude they can secure superior services elsewhere
in the market.83 National Party member Bruce Cliffe declared
that under the ECA:
Unions must now work for and earn their members. They
must provide a service, they must deliver agreements, and they
must want to protect their members. In other words, unions
must provide the service that is usual in a normal competitive
81. ECA § 5(a). Freedom of association was so fundamental that it composed Part I
of the ECA. "[T]he 'Freedom of Association embodied in Part I of the act is not the
traditional protection for collective action but a freedom to disassociate." PETER
CHURCHMAN & WALTER GRILLS, EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT REVISITED 4 (1994).
82. One area in which corporations can rely on the reality of'their aggregated nature
is labor law. Unions that cooperate with other unions to assert economic pressure on non-
struck parts of a corporation can not rely on a collective form. This result undercuts the
NLRA's aim of equalizing bargaining power. James Atleson, Law and Union Power:
Thoughts on the United States and Canada, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 463, 473 (1994). Atleson
concludes, "In sum, American law limits the extent to which the worker community can
protect itself against corporate structures that drastically alter power relationships." Id.
83. NZBR Board Member Alan Jones stated that "unions need to provide services
which are valuable, affordable, and relevant. If their customers think they are worthwhile
they'll survive; if not, they won't, and we'll see more groups of employees seeking advice
from other agencies in the market." ALAN JONES, WHAT WERE WE AFRAID OF? THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT-THE PAST-THE PRESENT-AND THE FUTURE 14-15
(1992).
24 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 18:1
business. Any successful enterprise understands the importance
of competition and I believe that the unions will now realise
that competition is the way it could be in labour relations.'
More specifically, ECA proponents argue that unions do not
serve many employees, because they negotiate only an average
wage for each classification, regardless of individual
qualifications.85 The NZEF has contended that unions were bent
on suppressing individuality. Peter Carroll, General Manager of
the Auckland Employers' Association, claimed that unions wished
to have "everyone toeing the same line with no deviation" and
despised those "not conforming with the union line."'86 From this,
it followed that individuals, especially exceptional workers, should
be allowed to opt out of the negotiated wage and that not doing
so would make them less inclined to be effective workers.87
84. PARL. DEB. (Hansard) 1659 (Apr. 30, 1991) (N.Z.). The NZEF blamed the LRA
for fostering a system in which unions had no motivation to promote the interests of
members and employers:
The system has created unions which are highly protected monopolies with
guaranteed customers (through compulsory membership), guaranteed cash flow
(through compulsory deduction of union fees), and no competition (through
exclusive coverage provisions). Such guarantees mean that unions are not market
driven; rather, an artificial market has been created for them.
New Zealand Employers Federation, supra note 76, at B-5. The NZEF's solution was that
unions "should be exposed to the same competitive environment other providers of goods
and services must face." Id. After enactment of the ECA, NZEF Board Member Alan
Jones argued:
As unions shrink and are, therefore, less ubiquitous, they will want to focus. No
one believes compulsory unionism will return. Therefore unions will want to
market themselves where they can be afforded. That is not amongst the lowest
paid .... Thus unions will have made at least one major, if historically perverse,
adjustment to the new environment: by ignoring those who were their roots they
will be able to ensure their own viability.
Jones, supra note 83, at 14; cf. McConville, supra note 55, at 469.
85. The common criticism of egalitarian communication is that it excludes difference
or disagreement and requires homogenization. See Barenberg, supra note 13, at 797.
Mahoney and Watson point out that minority interest employees may perceive the
uniformity that collective bargaining provides as creating internal distributive inequity and,
if they are denied a voice, as creating procedural inequity. Thomas Mahoney & Mary
Watson, Evolving Modes of Work Force Governance: An Evaluation, in FUTURE
DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 158.
86. Peter Carroll, Towards Voluntary Unionism: Serving People, Not Institutions,
EXAMINER, Dec. 6, 1990, at 23.
87. Brook, supra note 25, at 194. Even though the discussion was in terms of the
exceptional worker, it failed to consider that the majority of employees that the legislation
covers would not need or could not hope to secure any benefits through such a system.
What they most needed was basic protection from arbitrary action and collective resources
to enable them to secure decent conditions. In exchange for these, speaking with a less
than individualized voice might satisfy most. Paul Weiler, Governing the Workplace:
Bargaining Representation Under the ECA
Making unionism voluntary would induce unions to improve their
services and would boost workplace productivity.8 8 Penelope
Brook asked if there was any benefit to be gained by giving unions
an exclusive right to negotiate on behalf of a group of workers,
89
and suggested that unions might benefit from greater freedom to
"define the range and price of their activities (subject to their
ability to attract members) . .. ."'
ECA proponents never addressed the inconsistency in their
vision of a unitary workplace without conflicts between individual
employers' and workers' identities, needs, and purposes with their
idea that individual employees have needs so inherently in conflict
with one another that they need individualistic bargaining.91  In
addition, this characterization of workers ignores the fact that
"most work takes place in 'teams', in which the output of each
team member depends on what other members do; team produc-
tion is interdependent. This has two consequences: first, it is
usually difficult or. even impossible to isolate the contribution to
output of individual members of the team; second, productivity
Employee Representation in the Eyes of the Law, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS, supra note 13,
at 81, 88.
88. See, e.g., Lindsay Fergusson, Labour Relations: The State of the Debate, Address
Before the Institute for International Research Conference on Managing Change in
Industrial Relations 6-7 (Aug. 17, 1989); Murray Loach, Freedom in Employment, in
LABOUR MARKETS AND EMPLOYMENT: NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
STATEMENTS ON LABOUR RELATIONS 13, 14 (NZBR ed., 1988); NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT IN THE
1988/89 WAGE ROUND 6 (1989) [hereinafter NZBR].
89. Brook, supra note 25, at 194.
90. Id. at .196. In the United States, Professor Estreicher has articulated a position
close to Brook's in this respect. He advocates law reform to promote "value-added"
unionism. Estreicher, Labor Law Reform, supra note 24, at El-E2.
91. This criticism should not obscure the fact that unions have historically and
systematically excluded women .and minorities. Women advocated more inclusive
bargaining and attempted. to bring new issues to the table, including. discrimination, health
and safety, maternity leave, and hours of work. Linda Hill, Theories of Corporatism: A
Feminist Critique, in LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND WORK IN NEW ZEALAND 1994, supra
note 78, at 151, 155-56. Indeed, ECA proponents argued that women and minorities
would especially benefit from changing the bargaining method. Id. at 156. Ironically,
however, women workers proved to have more in common with their male co-workers
than ECA proponents thought, for they achieved better conditions under the LRA than
under the ECA. Suzanne Hammond & Raymond Harbridge, The Impact of the
Employment Contracts Act on Women at Work, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 15, 28 (1993);
Negotiation Still a Talking Point, EVENING POST, Feb. 25, 1995, at 21.
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depends on members helping each other and sharing infor-
mation."92
Labour Party spokesperson or Shadow Minister for Labour
Helen Clark argued that allowing a worker to change authority to
represent during bargaining would create instability: "The Minister
of Labour is so obsessed with choice that he cannot understand
that in some of* those matters choice could lead to anarchy and
instability."93  Ken Douglas of the Council of Trade Unions
(CTU) worried that the law lacked ways to select bargaining
representatives other than the parties' muscle and willingness to
use it:
There is no stability of representation required in the bill.
The bargaining agents can be changed as often as workers like
during the course of negotiating a contract, they can be changed
at contract renewal time, and the agencies for bargaining need
not be the same as those for administration or enforcement of
the contract.94
The Engineers Union criticized the ECA for failing to address
the essential conditions necessary to functioning labor law such as
selecting or removing a bargaining agent and defining the scope of
a bargaining agent's responsibilities.95 It contended that the ECA
further allowed an employer to determine who could become a
bargaining agent96 and allowed individual rights to "override the
collective good of an enterprise and of the wider body of people
working within it." 97
The issue of choice over stability demonstrates that the ECA
is not anti-union so much as it is naively doctrinaire. Union
concerns are obvious: unstable coalitions and unpredictable
resources in terms of people and dues. Unions, however, are not
the only ones concerned about the problems created by un-
hindered choice. Employers are worried that this instability is
detrimental to their interests. One employer, Telecom, foresaw
92. Tim Hazeldine, Employment in New Zealand: Then and Now, in LABOUR,
EMPLOYMENT AND WORK IN NEW ZEALAND 1994, supra note 78, at 19, 24.
93. PARL. DEB. (Hansard) 1428 (Apr. 23, 1991) (N.Z.).
94. Ken Douglas, The Employment Contracts Bill: Two Very Different Perspectives,
EXAMINER, Apr. 18, 1991, at 18.
95. Rex Jones, A Private Union's Perspective, Address delivered at the Longman
Professional Conference, Auckland 8 (May 7-8, 1991).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 9.
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that the law would lead to multiple bargaining representatives and
negotiations, that would threaten industrial relations within the
company.98 Carter Holt Harvey, Ltd., was concerned by workers
ability to retract authorizations, even late in the bargaining
process, and by the ECA's failure to deal with splits that might
develop among workers when they saw the tentative settlement
which their agent had achieved. 99 Peter Carroll, Chief of the
Auckland Employers Association, stated:
As a private opinion, I think that it's going to be freedom
at the expense of stability, which will be found undesirable by
employers and responsible unions and it may be confusing for
workers too.
At some stage in this act, or in some later legislation, the
possibility for introducing procedures for the recognition of
bargaining agents may be necessary. One has to have some
procedures for recognising how an agent gets his authority.
I think this is where there is most trepidation by the larger
employers, that we could be buying freedom at the cost of
stability. °°
Volatility, was destructive to company interests. The
proliferation of bargaining representatives coupled with a lack of
continuity in representation prevented the parties from building
trust and understanding.' The ECA pressured agents to
deliver. This created a situation in which "the agent was acting for
a small group of employees and continuing involvement with [a]
company was based purely on that agent's performance record
98. PARL. DEB. (Hansard) 1480 (Apr. 23, 1991) (N.Z.). Carter Holt Harvey, Ltd.,
worried about "the possible multitude of bargaining agents; the diversity of their own
interests, the logistics of proving authorization to represent employees, the ability of the
parties to retract that authorisation, the status of individual vs collective contracts, the
status of contracts on expiry, etc." Carter Holt Harvey Ltd., Submissions to the
Parliamentary Select Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 11-12 (n.d.).
99. Carter Holt Harvey, Ltd., supra note 98, at 16.
100. Rebecca Macfie, Buying Freedom at the Cost of Stability?, NAT'L Bus. REV., Feb.
18, 1991, at 1. McDonald's Corporation urged that workers should have to continue with
the bargaining representative they had chosen at the beginning of collective bargaining and
be unable to change representatives at a later stage even if they were dissatisfied with the
results of collective bargaining. It also argued for majority decision-making by employees.
McDonald's System of New Zealand Ltd., Submission to the Labor Select Committee on
the Employment Contracts Bill 3, 4 (Mar. 29, 1991).
101. Allan Taylor, Implications for Private Sector Bargaining, Address delivered at the
Longman Professional Conference, Auckland (May 7-8, 1991); Barenberg, supra note 18,
at 1470-71.
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being satisfactory to that small group of, employees, at the
disadvantage to the majority of other employees and the com-
pany."1 2  Encouraging bargaining agents to seek short term
goals of delivering better terms harmed industries' long term
interests.
In the Packaging Industry, as a single example, much effort
has been spent in restructuring wage classifications that will
encourage "upskilling" that is so necessary to its survival.. This
exercise has involved "give and take" on both sides. As a
major employer in that industry, we are not satisfied that just
any bargaining agent will be even conversant with, let alone
committed to these goals; we would submit that a bargaining
agent somehow should be directly affected by the outcome.0 3
Bill Birch, National Party Minister of Labour, dismissed these
concerns, arguing that, by allowing individuals to choose whether
to belong to a union or to bargain individually or collectively, the
ECA was "non-prescriptive" and left parties free to make their
own choices." He believed this freedom necessarily would
benefit business:
That is what labour market reform is all about-increased
productivity and better ways of doing things, leading to better
output, more exports, better profits, a higher standard of living,
and better wages. That it is the bottom line. It is time for us
to seek improvements in our work arrangements so that we are
more efficient, more productive, and more export oriented.0 5
Former union representative and management consultant, Rob
Campbell belittled employer concerns, stating:
Some of the less far-sighted and competent employer
representatives have been seen in action at the Select Commit-
tee bemoaning the difficulties [making strategic plans about
labour relations] will cause them. The same employers are
clearly fearful that they may face a number of bargaining agents
from within their workforce. This is an interesting case from an
economist's point of view as it presents the prospect of a buyer
being concerned at facing too many sellers! Certainly in
situations where the employer has no clear strategy and lacks
skills the prospect is daunting, but no labour relations system
102. Taylor, supra note 101, at 9.
103. Carter Holt Harvey, Ltd., supra note 98, -at 14-15.
104. PARL. DEB. (Hansard) 1429 (Apr. 23, 1991) (N.Z.).
105. Id.
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structured around the needs of the poorly prepared or incom-
petent employer has much of a future." 6
Shortly after its enactment, it was possible to see who was the
better prognosticator of the impact of the ECA's freedom of
choice on stability. Joris de Bres of the PSA explained how the
limitless freedom of association operated:
Our problem now is that you've really got a total in-
dividualization. There's no legal recognition of that step in the
process that says once you've made a democratic decision, you
stick with it for the term of the contract. That would have
made a big difference.
It's in those little technical difficulties of getting the process
going on a collective basis that I think we see our greatest
challenges. Anytime there's a sort of dip in the negotiation, if
we got that far, or in trying to establish how to bargain because
the employer might want 24 contracts and we want 3 or the like,
there are huge administrative obstacles, like getting individual
authorizations, the ability for any group to withdraw those
authorizations at any time in the process. And while in theory
it empowers the individual, it weakens the collective. That's at
the heart of it for us. There are going to be some pluses and
minuses, for instance, in any settlement that you reach with an
employer if you get that far. And if there's any hint of that
before a settlement, before the ratification process is over, any
group can, and some groups have, withdraw their authorization.
Because they don't want any variation in their conditions. So
... the Act is premised on... the individual having an absolute
power, vis a vis the collective. But the reality beyond that is
that the employer then has the additional power of being able
to deal essentially with individuals.'0 7
106. Rob Campbell, The Employment Contracts Bill: Two Very Different Perspectives,
EXAMINER, Apr. 18, 1991, at 18-19. These issues demonstrate a potential problem in the
United States should law reform lead to legalizing nonmajority unions as a way of
stemming the decline in union density. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a
World of Competitive Product Markets, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 6, at
13, 43; Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION,
supra note 6, at 95.
107. Interview with Joris de Bres, supra note 59. The Vice-President of the National
Right to Work Defense Foundation proposes a similar system for the United States. He
states that by enacting the NLRA,
Congress abrogated essential elements of the agency doctrine with respect to
private sector employees. As a result, individual workers have lost fundamental
liberties which were available to them at common law. Rather than allow the
common law and free market to yield voluntary and indiscriminate agencies
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According to de Bres, the ECA hindered unions' ability to
counsel patience in volatile situations. In 1992, for example,
negotiations came to the brink of shutting off electrical power
around the country. On this situation, 'de Bres noted:
Because we have no way left ... because normally when
things settle down and they say, "Oh well, that was O.K. That
was reasonable advice." Now they told us 3 weeks ago, "If you
don't serve that notice we will leave and serve it ourselves."
And so, there is much less room for a union to present a bit of
a longer term view or a broader strategic analysis of proposals
for industrial action for instance. It's basically "If you don't do
it, if you don't serve the notice we'll go." And we are
constantly now bargaining with our own members about
strategies and so on. So yes, it's had that effect.
There's no doubt, the Employment Contracts Act has both
empowered and disempowered workers. It's empowered them
individually. It's disempowered them collectively. So, it doesn't
matter ... the chief executive of the Department of Conser-
vation might want one union to deal with and an orderly,
system, but if we had, as we did a couple of weeks ago, we had
one bad meeting, where people disagreed with something an
organizer was saying-you get people saying, "If this doesn't
improve we'll leave." I don't think it's affected the majority of
workers yet, but it's sort of divided off anybody who wants to
divide off. And the employer can't do anything about that
either. He might refuse to negotiate with them, but then in turn
they would have their rights. But the one has a sort of strength
against them. It's a sort pseudo-power of workers based on
division. 08
In other words, the ECA's emphasis on the individual
encourages employees to see their well-being as founded not in
solidarity, compromise, patience, and the long term, but in
demanding that individual desires immediately be satisfied. This
is antithetical to enduring relationships or, ultimately,
between employees and their representatives, the Congress imposed upon
employees exclusive representatives with clearly adverse interests.
McConville, supra note 55, at 478.
108. 'Interview with Joris de Bres, supra note 59.
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democracies."°9  This was certainly the experience of unions
under the ECA.
You've got to get all sorts of written authorization. At the
end of the day, because of the individual nature of it, for
instance, ... When we went back to people to say, "Will you
sign individual authorities for us to serve notice of industrial
action?" The whole issue's been relitigated. Some people who
voted against, they happen to be, in our terms, quite a small
minority. The votes were all carried significantly. The people
who voted against, who would normally accept a majority were
saying, "Well, I voted against it. I'm not going to authorize you
to serve that notice."" 0
Individual voice, with easy exit under the ECA, "does not
promote deliberation among employees about shared preferences,
leaving management with conflicting signals from disagreeing
workers.""'..
.The drafters of the ECA clearly foresaw these problems. Two
weeks before introducing the ECA into Parliament, Ralph
Stockdill of the Industrial Relations Service cautioned Minister of
Labour Bill Birch that the system was unstable because workers
need not commit to a bargaining agent for any period of time.
Bargaining was likely to become protracted should workers not
approve an agreement their agent had reached and, as a conse-
quence, withdraw the agent's authority, necessitating beginning
negotiations again, with all preliminary matters left unresolved.
1 2
He argued that employers might have to deal with more, rather
than fewer, bargaining agents,"3 because the ECA did not limit
the number of agents even to one for each employee."4 Despite
109. Cf Kohler, supra note 11, at 229-30. The workplace is thus lost as a place where
individuals can learn to be citizens of a democracy by practicing seemingly insignificant
routines that build habits for action as individuals within society. Id. at 230.
110. Interview with Joris de Bres, supra note 59.
111. Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation
in a Nonunion Labor Market, in FUTURE DIRECrIONS, supra note 13, at 13, 27.
112. See Memorandum from R. A. Stockdill, General Manager, Industrial Relations
Service, Department of Labour, to W. F. Birch, Minister of Labour 2 (Dec. 7, 1990)
[hereinafter Memo from Stockdill to Birch].
113. Id. A major source of unhappiness with the old system had been the necessity of
dealing with multiple agents representing each job classification. For citations and the
terms of the debate, see Dannin, Labor Law Reform, supra note 4.
114. See Memo from Stockdill to Birch, supra note 112. A similar problem may arise
under certain amendment proposals to the NLRA that would permit "members only"
representation, thus resulting in.a proliferation of representatives. Matthew Finkin, The
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his advice, the government chose a system that promoted a
devolution to the individual in bargaining.
Although there was an initial decrease, the number of unions
began to increase after the ECA's enactment even though the
number of members and density continued to decline dramatically.
The proliferation of unions under these conditions means that
there are many small and, most likely, ineffective unions at a time
when unions need strength to face the challenges of the ECA.
DATE UNIONS MEMBERSHIP DENSITY
MAY 1991 80 603,118 65%
DEC. 1991 66 514,325 56%
DEC. 1992 58 428,160 46%
DEC. 1993 67 409,112 43%
DEC. 1994 82 375,906 23.4%
Table 1115
The proliferation of unions did not necessarily mean that
there was only one union representing workers in each workplace,
a result that many ECA proponents had advocated."t6 Instead,
some workplaces experienced a situation like that of Air New
Zealand's pilots. The traditional union negotiated collective
contracts for some pilots, while another union represented others,
and the rest were on individual contracts."7
The problems that emerged from the lack of a systematic
method of ascertaining. representation can serve as a lesson to
Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, in FUTURE
DIREcTIONS, supra note 13, at 199.
115. Harbridge, supra note 45, at 176; Harbridge & Hince, supra note 45, at 355;
Georgina Bailey, Nation's Workers Walk Out on Unions, EVENING POST, July 15, 1995,
at 1. The source for data in each time period is different, which may contribute to some
of the changes. Accompanying this increase in the number of unions and decrease in
members was an increase in negotiations. The National Distribution Union, moved from
55 negotiations before the ECA to 700 after its enactment. ILO REPORT, supra note 48,
para. 154(c).
116. See Dannin, Labor Law Reform, supra note 4, at 24-25.
117. Hazeldine, supra note 92, at 24.
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those who advocate nonmajority unions as a solution for declining
union density in the United States.! 8  The New Zealand
situation demonstrates that stability and clear procedures are
important prerequisites for unionization and that merely allowing
unions to come into existence will only produce a meaningless
result.
B. Bargaining with Authorized Representatives
Nothing in the ECA required an employer to bargain with its
employees' representative. Instead, employees could authorize a
representative only to have their employer exercise its absolute
freedom to choose whether to negotiate. Thus, engaging in
negotiations was an act completely disaggregated from employee
authorization. By allowing the freedom to choose whether to
negotiate, an employee's authorization of a bargaining represen-
tative was rendered a meaningless act. Here, as discussed earlier,
the ECA's evenhanded language, which gave this right both to
employers and employees, operated only to disadvantage
employees and to the advantage of the employers. Only
employers were likely to employ this option and even the drafters
must have been aware that this was the case. As discussed earlier,
not only are workers more eager to bargain and thus more willing
to treat with the employer's representative, but they also lack the
innate power employers have over workplace conditions, which can
be used to force employees to accede to the employer's wishes.
If the ECA drafters lacked the ability to draw these
conclusions, employers and their representatives made it clear that
they championed absolute power over codetermination. During
the ECA's pendency in Parliament, the NZEF contended that an
employer who recognized an employee's agent was not obliged to
negotiate as a result. Rather, involvement of the agent would
itself be a matter for negotiation."9 Allied with this position, but
more forcefully put, was the demand for absolute employer control
over workplace conditions. Oddly enough, employers claimed they
were as powerless unless they were allowed full control. For
example, Progressive Enterprises argued that if it could not control
the formation of employment contracts there would be "dissension
118. For a discussion of these proposals, see Estreicher, supra note 106, at 43.
119. Letter from Steve Marshall, Director General of the New Zealand Employers
Federation, to Noel Galvin, Clerk of the Labour Select Committee 1-2 (Feb. 18, 1991).
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among employees as to the manner of establishing their
employment contract ... with the Company left as an affected
bystander obliged to accept whatever is put before it."'t2
Progressive Enterprises further contended that not only should
employers have the discretion whether to recognize the workers'
chosen representative, but they must also have final authority on
determining workplace terms and conditions. 2'
Initially, the departments involved in drafting the ECA
forecast difficulties if employers had unfettered discretion to recog-
nize their employees' agents. This discretion naturally would lead
to practical problems. Giving employers such absolute power also
would contravene the philosophical underpinnings of the ECA by
nullifying workers' freedom of association and choice, thus making
the Act unbalanced.'22 By failing to resolve the conflict between
employers' and employees' rights and instead relying on the
abstraction of freedom of choice to determine the outcome of the
conflict, the government invited confrontation and unproductive
strikes, lockouts, and other forms of unrest in the workplace."2
As the introduction of the bill that would become the ECA
drew near, the departments made a surprising reversal and took a
more sanguine view of giving employers this power:
[A]lthough a group of workers may have chosen a
particular bargaining agent, recognized by the employer as
required by the legislation, the employer will have the right to
refuse to negotiate. Thus, employers will effectively be able to
challenge the workers' choice of bargaining agent.
124
This changed position was stunning in its simplistic and rigid
ideological confidence that was so divorced from reality.125  In
order for Stockdill, an experienced and savvy government official,
120. Progressive Enterprises, Ltd., Submission to the Labour Select Committee on the
Employment Contracts Bill 5-6 (n.d.).
121. Id. at 8.
122. See Memorandum from R. A. Stockdill, General Manager of the Industrial
Relations Service of the Department of Labour, and D. J. Martin, Assistant Commissioner
of the State Services Commission, to Minister of Labour and Minister of State Services 4-5,
9 (Nov. 12, 1990) [hereinafter after Stockdill & Martin Memo].
123. Id. at 9-10.
124. -Memo from Stockdill to Birch, supra note 112, at 2.
125. This was not the only instance that saw coherence sacrificed for ideology in the
operation of the ECA. See, e.g., Paul Roth, A Contract Law Perspective on the
Individual/Collective Employment Contract Nexus: What is the Status of a Section 19(2)
Agreement?, 8 OTAGo L. REV. 77, 92 (1993).
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to write this memorandum, he had to ignore contemporary press
reports and employer organizations' statements encouraging
employers to have the final say in bargaining. Those made it clear
that the norm would be unilateral governance. 2 6  It also con-
fused submission with consent. Stockdill was willing to ignore that
pitting employer against employee in this matter, with no guidance
from the state, destroyed even the illusion of bargaining equality.
Most peculiar was the position that an employee representative
selected by the employer might be anything other than il-
legitimate.127 The memo defied common sense by envisioning
that the choice of representative was based on simple logic,
essentially a cost-benefit analysis. The Stockdill memo failed to
appreciate that workers might feel strong attachment to their
representative and be unwilling to "change their choice" to one the
employer preferred, regardless of the benefits of doing so.'28
Had anyone reversed the words "employer" and "employee" in
the memo, the difficulties would have been patent. Finally, the
memo overrode one of the stated purposes of the ECA: "to allow
employees to determine who should represent their interests in
relation to employment issues."' 29
The Stockdill memo and the ECA embody the view that an
employer's status alone entitles him to control the process of
setting workplace terms, even though those terms have important
consequences for both employers and employees. This position
also suggests that the drafters saw the employment relationship,
126. In a lawsuit brought in 1992, the employer argued it had the right to change the
terms of employment contracts unilaterally because it was the philosophy of the ECA to
promote agreements reflecting market conditions. The court found, however, that sanctity
of contract accompanied freedom of contract. Northern Distrib. Union, Inc. v. 3 Guys,
Ltd., [19921 3 E.R.N.Z. 903, 921-22 (1992).
127. Greenfield & Pleasure, supra note 13, at 178.
128. One reason the memo suffered from these flaws was that the legislation was the
product of a highly undemocratic drafting process. The drafters made no effort to solicit
or provide for the concerns of other than a very limited part of New Zealand society. The
only non-governmental body consulted was the New Zealand Employers Federation. See
Memorandum from Bill Birch, Minister of Labour, to Cabinet Legislation Committee
Annex B, 2 (Dec. 1990). Left out of the process were many potentially interested parties,
including the New Zealand CTU, "workers, unions and employers in general." Id. at 3.
The government itself admitted "[tlhere has been limited consultation on the Bill." Id.
Thus, it was easier to take seriously employer's concerns that, even though their employees
might have chosen a particular bargaining representative, that representative might not be
a legitimate representative in the sense of doing what-was best for the enterprise and thus
the workers.
129. Employment Contracts Bill (Long Title of the ECA).
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however it was conducted, as having no consequences outside the
workplace. This placed undue faith in individual employers,
particularly when one considers that the ECA was designed to play
a pivotal role in the economy.3 ° Such a view, however, did
comport with a strong belief in the power of freedom of contract
to lead to a positive outcome on a larger scale.
Nevertheless, giving employers absolute freedom to decide
whether or not to deal with employees' authorized representatives
is not the only impediment the ECA has created for collective
bargaining. For employers who wanted an excuse to refuse to
bargain, the ECA provides numerous grounds on which employers
can legitimately refuse. It would be unfair, however, to suggest
that all employers take advantage of these protections. Some
employers see union representation as advantageous. Francis
Weevers, a management consultant, explained:
They are much better off to have the work force which is
comfortable in terms of its relationship with the employer and
in which the employer recognizes that the employees have an
entitlement to be represented by the union. And that the
employer is relaxed about that than actively trying to separate
them from their union because the negative impact of that is
that people then don't trust the employer. They suspect that.
They wonder about the employer's motivation.'
31
Nonetheless, others have taken a different view and have used
the ECA to create roadblocks, starting with simply refusing to talk
to the union about collective agreements. Joris de Bres explained:
We went to see the employer, said we are authorized to
come to negotiate with you on a collective contract. They said,
we don't want a collective contract. We recognize you as their
130." It is worth noting here that legislators have conceived most labor law, including
the NLRA and its predecessor legislation, § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933 (NIRA), less as labor law than as instrumentalities to promote economic recovery.
The NLRA and NIRA, however, subscribe to different economic rationales. The NIRA
was
industrial recovery legislation that, through codes of fair competition, enabled
industries to cartelize their depression-ridden markets. The exchange was
entirely deliberate-representational rights for workers as a price for market
controls for industry . . . . The Wagner Act contained an explicit economic
rational: collective bargaining would give rise to the mass purchasing power
necessary for sustained economic growth.
Brody, supra note 7, at 36-37.
131. Interview with Francis Weevers, Principal of Francis Weevers and Associates, Ltd.,
in Wellington, N.Z. (May 20, 1992).
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representative, but we've got nothing to talk about, but we're
perfectly happy for you to come along as the representative of
each individual to assist in the negotiation of their individual
contract.
We cannot require--despite the clear wish of the
worker-we have no mechanism other than strike to advance
the case for a collective contract and the court does not require
anything. The law does not require anything of an employer in
terms of actually meeting, let alone bargaining in good faith .
32
Refusal to recognize and bargain with authorized unions
usually involves employers: (1) attempting to bypass the union and
* to deal directly with employees to set employment terms, in effect,
setting up its chosen bargaining representative; (2) actually creating
and recognizing an entity other than the authorized union,
tantamount to a minority union; and (3) making threats and
pressuring employees to revoke authorizations.
In some cases, more than one of these actions occurred, and
often they were used together. For example, forcing employees to
revoke authorizations may occur in tandem with a demand to deal
directly with the employer; indeed, employer associations have
seen them as tightly connected. The NZEF and NZBR charac-
terized Adams v. Alliance Textiles'33 as a case in which the court
turned back a union's attack "on an employer's attempts to
132. Interview with Joris de Bres, supra note 59. Agreements available and means of
bargaining under the ECA differ markedly from those of other legislation. The form of
contract, collective or individual, reveals nothing of the process which produced it.
Employees may become individual signatories to a collective employment contract (CEC)
with no collective negotiation or collective action of any kind. Conversely, an individual
employment contract (IEC) may be the product of collective negotiations in the sense that
it has terms identical to every other IEC in the workplace, that it emerged from actual
collective negotiations, or that it came about by operation of law at the expiration of a
CEC, thus perpetuating terms negotiated collectively. ECA § 19(4).
An IEC is simply "an employment contract that is binding on only one employer and
one employee." id. § 2. A CEC is collective only in the most technical of senses: it is "an
employment contract that is binding on one or more employers and 2 or more employees."
Id. In other words, the addition of one employee to an IEC would change it into a CEC.
Although it has minimal numerical requirements, a CEC can be a powerful document that
establishes the terms for all other employees employed by that employer. Id. § 19(2). The
ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association found the ECA's failure to promote
collective bargaining was incompatible with ILO principles. ILO REPORT, supra note 48,
IT 254-55.
133. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982 (1991), appeal dismissed as moot, [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783
(C.A. 1993).
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negotiate directly with its employees."1" To them Alliance
demonstrated that the court understood that employers could
"take strong industrial action in support of negotiations for a
collective employment contract."'135  The Alliance decision
eventually led to a situation in which a judge could state that
negotiations under the ECA bear no resemblance to the actions
normally associated with that word. Under the ECA, negotiations
may mean no more than "a presentation by one intended party to
the contractual relationship of a form of contract to the other and
then former's refusal to deviate from its offer.'
136
1. Direct Dealing
The ECA's refusal to prescribe or proscribe conduct created
a difficult impediment to overcome before collective bargaining
could take place. Rick Barker of the Service Workers Federation
explained that the permissive and individualistic nature of the
legislation failed to foster collective bargaining and impeded
organization.
[W]hat they were able to say to unions was not that you
can't do this or can't do that. You can do whatever you like.
They simply prescribe for a completely open situation and by
creating a system of almost total anarchy, there's going to be
the complete antithesis of organization.
31
Thus, the ECA gave employees the freedom to choose a bar-
gaining representative or not and employers freedom to choose to
negotiate with that representative or not. Having the ability to
choose "or not" legitimatize a wide range of behavior.
Key to the issue of direct dealing as a species of permis-
siveness is section 20(3) of the ECA and how courts would
interpret this section. Section 20(3) states:
. Any employer may, in negotiating for a collective
employment contract, negotiate with-
(a) The employees themselves; or
134. NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYERS
FEDERATION, A STUDY OF THE LABOUR-EMPLOYMENT COURT 36 (Dec. 1992).
135. Id. at 37. Alliance is one of the few reported cases in which the employer also
created a company union.
136. Northern Distribution Union, Inc. v. 3 Guys Ltd., [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. 903, 915
(1992):
137. Interview with Rick Barker, supra note 53.
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(b) If the employees so wish, any authorized
representative of the employees. 38
This section's wording could support either of two interpretations:
(1) arguably, using the permissive word "may" gives an employer
discretion to choose whether or not to bargain with its employees
or their authorized representative; or (2) section 20(3)(b) can be
read as forbidding an employer from bargaining with its employees
if they have authorized a bargaining representative. Deciding
which is the proper interpretation is difficult and requires can-
vassing what is known about the ECA's perception of bargaining.
First, the ECA does not exclude or include anything in terms
of what can be bargained. It has few strictures on bargaining
conduct beyond forbidding the use of duress in obtaining a
contract.'39 This permissiveness was not an oversight. Indeed,
influential ECA proponents advocated entrusting all bargaining
matters, substantive and procedural, to the parties and the market
forces.' 4  Treasury, the department ascendant in this period,
wanted to "bring labour market contracting firmly within the law
of contract and general law.''. The ECA approaches, but does
138. ECA § 20(3).
139. The ECA provides that if an employment contract or any part of it is procured
"by harsh and oppressive behaviour or by undue influence or duress" or if the contract or
any part of it "was harsh and oppressive when it was entered into," the court can set the
contract aside in whole or in part, or order that compensation be paid. ECA § 57(1), (4).
140. Electricorp had advocated: "The legislation that is enacted must not be prescriptive
if the freedom of association that it espouses, and that is so critical to the development of
efficient labour market relationships, is to be achieved." Electricity Corporation, supra
note 20, at 22. Section 3 of the draft ECA had provided, "Nothing in this Act limits the
right of any person to negotiate for an employment contract in a manner other than that
provided by this Act." Employment Contracts Bill (Long Title of the ECA) § 3. This
allowed parties to "contract out" of the ECA and thus had the potential to make the law
a nullity.
Under the ECA, parties could negotiate the number and the type of contracts, but
they could never get to the terms and conditions of work. The draft also would have
allowed an employer to force the parties outside the meager protections of the ECA. Id.
141. Memorandum from Bill Birch, Minister of Labour, to the Chairman, Cabinet
Strategy Committee 15 (Nov. 1990). Treasury, guided by Treasury Minister Ruth
Richardson, stood for a complete free market approach that would apply only the common
law to labor relations. As Murray French of the Wellington Regional Employers
Association described the situation:
[I]ndeed a large degree of influence was exercised by the spokesman for Finance,
Ruth Richardson, albeit that she in fact at that time had very much a far more
radical approach to labor relations and that essentially was that there was no
need for an act at all, it would simply be covered by normal contract law. And
in fact labor relations legislation could be something in the order of three or four
clauses. And indeed that was a serious possibility at one time.
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not fully embody, this approach. Nonetheless, the idea of a free
market in labor contracting permeates the ECA and informs its
providing employers the freedom to choose not to deal with
employees' designated representatives. In essence, this is the same
situation as a buyer who might decide not to deal with a particular
vendor.
14 2
Labor negotiations, however, materially differ from
negotiations with a commercial vendor.'43 In a commercial
vendor context, either party can walk away from negotiations and
pursue other deals, never to meet again. Even if an employer
refuses to deal with a union, however, it is unlikely that this will
cause the relationship to terminate. The employees most likely
will continue to work for their employer but with no means to
assert their freedom of choice and association.'" The ECA's
drafters assumed that the labor market was competitive. If they
were wrong in this assumption, then all deregulation accomplished
was removing protections from the most disadvantaged
employees.'45  The drafters were not concerned that they were
establishing public policy not on "sound, empirical research but
[on] unworldly theorizing."'" Instead of tackling the ECA's
conflict and potential mistaken foundation, the drafters confidently
let market forces resolve these matters. What they did not intend,
but what naturally had to happen, was that this simply shifted
responsibility to the courts to interpret and resolve this fundamen-
tal issue. Indeed, this confidence in the courts was not misplaced,
Interview with Murray French, Wellington Regional Employers Association, in Wellington,
N.Z. (May 14, 1992).
142. See Gottesman, supra note 6, at 70.
143. EDWARDS, supra note 41, at 56-59. This difference should not be unexpected
because strong evidence exists that labor markets do not function in the way auction
markets do, given turnover costs. What appear to be rigidities (sluggish workforce
adjustment and wage stickiness) are actually the outcome of efficient transactions between
workers and firms. Beuchtmann, supra note 3, at 47. Boyer argues that the neo-classical
model can only operate in a simplistic form that ignores important factors. Robert Boyer,
The Economics of Job Protection and Emerging New Capital-Labor Relations, in
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, supra note 3, at 69, 117. This is a problem because it is not
empirically based. Brian Towers, Employee Protection Policy, the Labor Market, and
Employment: The U.K. Experience, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, supra note 3, at 328,338.
144. In contrast, the NLRA is based on a belief that the employment contract differs
from commercial. contracts as a result of the employee's dependency on the job and the
psychology of subordination. Thus, constraints are necessary to keep the employer from
acts that affect the employee's ability to self-represent. Gottesman, supra note 6, at 70-71.
145. Towers, supra note 143, at 337.
146. Id. at 338.
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at least in the first years of the ECA's existence. "The courts
could be relied on to rule against collective interventions by
reference to freedom in the labor market.'
147
This issue was so fundamental that it arose in a case even
before the newly established Employment Court's rules of
procedure had been drafted.' 48 In that case, Adams v. Alliance
Textiles, 149 the Employment Court held that the ECA required
an employer to recognize a representative's authority once it is
given; 5' it held, however, the implications of such recognition,
were left undefined. In addition, because the ECA did not
prohibit an employer's direct communication with its employees,
the court inferred that the ECA permitted any communication,
even ones which "undermine[d] the ability of the representative to
negotiate or to negotiate effectively."' 5' Thus, the court held,
Alliance violated no law when it bypassed its employees' chosen
representative to bargain with the workers individually.'52
Furthermore, the court said, Alliance violated no law even though
it used highly coercive tactics to persuade the employees to
negotiate directly.'53 The NLRA recognizes tactics such as
threats and lockouts in order to force employees to deal directly
with their employer as illegal. 54
Alliance essentially condoned Stockdill's suggestion that an
employer be permitted to disapprove of a bargaining represen-
tative and insist upon the employer's own method of bargaining.
147. Guy Standing, Labor Regulation in an Era of Fragmented Flexibility, in
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, supra note 3, at 427.
148. Interview with Robyn Haultain, supra note 69.
149. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982,986-87 (1991).
150. Id. at 1009.
151. Id. at 1010.
152. Patricia Herbert, Employers Cash in on a Legal Advantage, DOMINION, Dec. 27,
1991, at 6. According to Union attorney Robyn Haultain:
[The court] basically said that the worker could repudiate the authority that they
gave the union merely by dealing directly with the employer. They took the view
that it wasn't the employer that didn't recognize the union's bargaining authority,
they basically said that the workers by choosing, and I use that word really
advisedly, by choosing to deal directly with the employer had simply sacked us
as their authorized bargaining representative and had made the decision to deal
as individuals with the employer and that if the individual workers wanted their
authorized representative to be recognized by the-employer, then their job was
to insist that happen.
Interview with Robyn Haultain, supra note 69.
153. Alliance, [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 1033 (1991).
154. For a discussion of this aspect of the Alliance decision, see Dannin, Bargaining,
supra note 5, at 10.
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The employer in Alliance did just that, but the reality of allowing
an employer to exercise this sort of power was that the represen-
tative form the employer preferred for its employees was no
representation at all. It is likely that this will be the outcome of
similar situations.
Three years later, the Employment Court appeared to retreat
from this position in New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers
Union v. Capital Coast Health.'55 After protracted negotiations,
Capital Coast distributed a letter in which it claimed it was trying
to protect its employees from their union's irresponsibility. Capital
Coast then attempted to persuade its employees to sign its offered
agreement.'56 The Employment Court found the letter was
"written with the intention of deliberately bringing [the union
representative] into disrepute with the members of the union...
who were using the union as their bargaining agent."1' 7 In
Capital Coast, unlike Alliance, employees refused to meet without
their union representative and did not acquiesce in the employer's
demands.' 58  Thus, the court could not conclude that they had
chosen to change their representative, as it did in Alliance.
It is difficult to determine, however, what significance Capital
Coast will have. This case was written while the ILO was
scrutinizing the court's decisions. A particular focus of the ILO in-
quiring was charges that cases such as Alliance demonstrated that
the ECA violated international labor standards.'59 On the one
hand, at about the same time, the Employment Court accepted as
standard practice a letter from a representative who wished to
negotiate for and protect workers, which said, "If you choose to
155. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 93 (1994): It is difficult to say how much this case changed
employer behavior. See Lee Tan, Romanos Workers Fight for Collective Bargaining Rights,
LAB. NOTES, Dec. 1994, at 6.
156. Capital Coast Health, Ltd.; [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. at 103-04 (1994).
157. Id. at 102; accord Ford v. Capital Trusts, Ltd., [1995] 2 E.R.N.Z. 47, 59-64 (1995);
Ivamy v. N.Z. Fire Serv. Comm'n, [1995] 1 E.R.N.Z. 724, 760-61 (1995).
158. Capital Coast Health, Ltd., [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. at 109-10 (1994).
159. The New Zealand CTU submitted a complaint to the ILO on February 8, 1993.
The Committee on Freedom of Association was to examine evidence, taken through
November 1993, at a later meeting held in March 1994. The Committee found cause for
concern in its interim report. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 292ND REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, Case No. 1698 1 675-78 (March 1994). The
Committee sent a mission to visit New Zealand from September 19-27, 1994. ILO
REPORT, supra note 48, 133. The Committee mentioned Capital Coast as key to the
question of whether the ECA violated international standards; it concluded that the
situation needed further monitoring. Id. 261.
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make further contact with members of your staff outside their
normal hours of work for the purpose of discussing this Union's
involvement with the negotiations and the need for them to belong
to a Union, then that is your prerogative."'" On the other hand,
even in 1995, the Employment Court continued to issue decisions
that reflected its awareness that international bodies were
scrutinizing its outcomes.'
61
Direct dealing is a pervasive practice under the ECA. It
occurs, not only during contract negotiations, but also in the
context of handling grievances. New Zealand Nurses Association
(NZNA) organizer Donna Payne explained that her union dealt
with employers who regularly attempted to bypass the union when
the employers disciplined employees or violated a contract.
There are more attempts not to recognize the NZNA and
go straight to the staff direct .... I've seen that happen when
I've had to review service or say they have a problem with an
individual over their work performance, or something like that,
then instead of not dealing with the NZNA, they go straight to
the individual. I have one case up in Taranaki on behalf of the
individual and they never responded to my letters; whereas, in
the past they would have done. 62
Direct dealing highlights problems that arise when unions do
not have ready access to workers and, therefore, have little ability
to protect them. As an employer witness testified in Capital Coast,
the employer recognized the union's right to be involved in the
process of negotiation; however, it was making the employees
responsible for keeping the union informed. 63 With curtailed
access and few protections to assert their rights, workers had a
hard time making certain that their union received the information
it needed to fulfill its role as their representative.
160. Caledonian Cleaners & Caterers, Ltd. v. Hetariki; [1994], 2 E.R.N.Z. 400, 403
(1994). The employer allowed the employee involved, however, to walk out of the
employer's attempted negotiations without disciplining her for doing so. Id. at 412.
161. See Ford v. Capital Trusts, Ltd., [1995] 2 E.R.N.Z. 47, 60 (1995); Ivamy v. N.Z.
Fire Serv. Comm'n, [1995] 1 E.R.N.Z. 724, 768 (1995).
162. Interview with Donna Payne, Organizer, New Zealand Nurses Association, in
Wellington, N.Z. (May 8, 1992).
163. New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union, Inc. v. Capital Coast Health,
Ltd., [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 93, 110 (1994).
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2. Dealing with a Nonauthorized Representative
In Alliance, the employer was not content only to deal directly
with its employees. It tried to wean employees away from their
union by creating a bargaining representative for employees which
the employer preferred. In other words, it did as Stockdill sug-
gested: its workers were "obliged to change their choice of
bargaining agent in order to gain agreement to negotiate and
conclude a contract."'' " This took several steps. The company
first attempted to negotiate with plant delegates, although they had
no authority from employees to do so.165 When this was unsuc-
cessful, it created the Mosgiel Independent Thought Society, "an
incorporated society whose constitution was drawn up by the
company's lawyers and which was underwritten by the company to
the tune of $10,000."' 66
The issue of "company unions" was a majbr focus of debates
when the legislature passed the Wagner Act and again has become
an important issue with the introduction of legislation to repeal or
modify section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. The NLRA's drafters felt
that banning company unions was essential if worker choice was
to exist.167  Section 8(a)(2) is the linchpin to the NLRA's "re-
storing equality of bargaining power" between employees "who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract" and "employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership" and to encourage the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining.' 6 It assigns separate spheres
to employers and unions and prohibits either from interfering with
the other.
69
164. Memo from Stockdill to Birch, supra note 112.
165. Adams v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.), Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982, 1001-02 (1991).
166. Id. at 999, 1104; Alliance Tries Union Busting, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Dec. 1991,
at 7. Alliance also asked job applicants to indicate whether they preferred the union or
the ITS. Id. The court's condoning such organizations was an issue of concern to the
ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association. ILO REPORT, supra note 48, 137(h).
167. Despite removing an option workers might choose, the drafters did not see this as
the paternalistic nullification of choice. Barenberg, supra note 13, at 776. Barenberg
canvasses various views on the transformative impact company unionism has on workers'
consciousness. At one extreme, it may have so strong an effect that it "help[s] sustain
management's illegitimate asymmetric power." Id. at 802. At the other extreme, it fosters
the unitary view and thus has a positive impact on the workplace. Id. at 803.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1995); see Greenfield & Pleasure, supra note 13, at 187.
169. Estreicher, supra note 106, at 21.
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The ECA sees no need to "restore equality of bargaining
power," because it believes it was never lost. ECA freedom of
choice prohibits eliminating any options, even options that nullify
one party's autonomy and ability to make meaningful choices. It
thus contains no prohibitions against recognizing and bargaining
with a nonrepresentative. As was the case in Alliance, company
unions are likely to appear at a time of crisis when employees are
seeking effective representation. 7 ' When the employer attempts
to destroy its employees' chosen representative and then presents
its employees with the representative it favors, the company union
becomes an attractive choice, even if employees know it is likely
to be ineffective.'
17
To be effective in determining workplace conditions,
employees need a representative "sufficiently powerful that the
employer, feels compelled to engage in negotiations about terms
and conditions of employment.' ' 172  If organizations that are
willing and able to represent workers' interests can be displaced by
sham unions or bargaining agents, then eventually only ersatz
unions will exist. 73  Whether the law creates and enforces an
obligation to recognize the workers' chosen union affects workers'
willingness to join a union. When an employer can avoid dealing
with a union, workers will conclude that joining or supporting a
union is futile. If an employer can impose a union on its
employees, they may join it despite their preferences. 74 Thus,
170. Ellen Dannin, When More Than Dues Are Due: Remedies for Section 8(a)(2)
Violations, 35 LAB. L.J. 574, 574 (1984); Pan American Grain Co., 317 N.L.R.B. No. 72
(1995).
171. Joel Rogers's and Richard Freeman's 1994 study reported this phenomenon.
Workers Want More Influence, Not Adversarial Relationship, 232 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),
at D15 (Dec. 6, 1994).
172. Colin Hicks, Submission on the Employment Contracts Bill 7 (Feb. 18, 1991).
173. Id.; Estreicher, supra note 106, at 35.
174. Hicks, supra note 172, at 8. In the United States, a 1988 Gallup poll showed that
even though 56% of workers thought their bosses reacted positively to concer*ns raised by
individual workers, 45% reported holding back their concerns and 54% said they would
prefer raising their concerns through an association. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 111,
at 27. An issue related to minority unions is the NLRA's forbidding employers to solicit
employee grievances in order to discourage them from joining a union. See, e.g., Flexsteel
Indus., Inc. and United Steel Workers of America, 316 N.L.R.B. No. 745 (1995). Soliciting
grievances with an implied or explicit promise of remedying them is a halfway house to
a company union-it deflects employees from choosing a functioning union.
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an employer may co-opt employees' freedom of choice by creating
a favored representative.175
The contrast on this point between the Wagner model and the
ECA is clear. Under the Wagner model, the NLRA has
concluded that if the law does not forbid employers from dealing
with nonrepresentatives, unions find it difficult to retain workers'
loyalty and cohesiveness in the face of strong employer op-
position.'76 Employees would be unable to resist employer
pressures to accept the company union even if they know it will
not advance their interests.. The ECA reaches a contrary
conclusion: the, parties must resolve this conflict of freedoms with
minimal state interference. Indeed, given the unitary view of the
workplace, the union favored by the workers likely will be one of
which the employer approves.
3. Pressuring Employees to Revoke Authorizations
Because union representation under the ECA depends on
employee authorizations, an effective way to eliminate any
obligations to a representative is to persuade employees to
withdraw their authorizations.'77 The ECA allows employees
only a fragile collective, always subject to disintegration and inter-
union rivalry. This has created a growth industry for attorneys and
others who wanted to expand their current businesses by offering
services as employee representatives. Joris de Bres of the PSA
explained:
On the other hand, we're facing competition from non-union
bargaining agents, lawyers, consultants and so on. We're facing
some degree of competition from other unions, some of them
not in the Council of Trade Unions who have set up separately.
We are facing competition from new organizations set up as
staff associations, for instance, either with employer support or
because they're not satisfied with the service we give them. So
we've got that sort of flank to be mindful of.'78
175. Barenberg, supra note 13, at 781-82.
176. Employees may believe they are getting a deal because they pay no dues, and
therefore, any benefits they receive through a company union appear to be cost-free. This
disguises the fact that any company union's expenses ultimately come from labor and
management's joint surplus. Id. at 805.
177. Under the NLRA, an employer commits a violation if it solicits employees to
abandon a union. See, e.g., Wehr Constructors, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 867 (1994).
178. Interview with Joris de Bres, supra note 59.
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If schism, shifting alliances, and employer insistence that
employees abandon their representatives are insufficient to provide
the employer with the workplace governance it wants, the ECA
does not forbid employers from coercing employees to revoke
their authorizations.179 An open question has been how far an
employer can go to avoid dealing with a bargaining representative.
The ECA says nothing about what kind of pressure, if any, an
employer can use to persuade employees to revoke their
authorizations. At first, this failure to protect employee
authorizations seems peculiar since they are so fundamental to the
ECA processes and actions of lesser importance are given
protection. For example, the ECA protects union member-
ship,' holding union office, contract negotiation, and grievance
handling' but is silent on authorizing representation."t 2
Instead, the ECA offers tempting opportunities for employers
inclined to pressure employees to revoke their authorizations. In
Alliance, the employer threatened those workers who had
authorized the union to represent them with a lockout, subse-
quently locked them out, and told them they could not sign the
employer's offered agreement until they had revoked their
authorizations. 83 The union argued that this was harsh and
oppressive behavior, undue influence, or duress in the procurement
of a contract, which was a violation of section 57 of the ECA. The
court saw the issue more blandly, as
179. This ability to coerce revocations was an issue of concern in the ILO's interim
report. ILO REPORT, supra note 48, 137(0.
180. Establishing, maintaining, or resigning membership in an employee organization
is to be unhindered. ECA § 6. Furthermore, the ECA fully protects freedom to associate
with other employees. Id. § 5. Section 8 prohibits exerting "undue influence, directly or
indirectly, on any other person with intent to induce that other person" to'become, remain
or cease from being a member of "an employees organisation." Id. § 8(a), (b); see also id.
§§ 27(1)(e), 30. Even though it prohibited duress under those circumstances, the
Employment Court interpreted duress in such a liberal way as to strip it of its effec-
tiveness. See Dannin, Bargaining, supra note 5.
181. Section 28(1) and (2) prohibit discrimination against an employee who is an officer
of an employee organization, acts as a negotiator, acts as a representative of an employee
organization, forms a union, is involved in pressing a claim under a contract, or submits
a personal grievance. ECA § 28(1), (2).
182. The employee's right to choose representation freely is the second specific goal in
the Long Title to the ECA, appearing just after freedom of association. Employment
Contracts Bill (Long Title of the ECA) (b). No provisions exist in the ECA that protect
the employees' right to choose a representative.
183. Adams v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.), Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982,993 (1991), appeal
dismissed as moot, [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783 (C.A. 1993).
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whether strong statements by the employer expressing its
criticism of the union's conduct in trenchant terms or expressing
its own preference that the employees should choose to
negotiate direct with the employer rather than through a
representative amounted to breaches of ... the Act and
resulted... by means of subtle and even unexpressed hints of
what the consequences might be of non-compliance with the
employer's wishes, in the procurement of employment contracts
by the means referred to in section 57(1)(a). -
The Employment Court found that the ECA's express
prohibitions were directed only against pressure regarding
membership in an organization, as distinguished from pressure
regarding the choice of a representative.'85  The court saw this
as creating two issues: (1) "whether the nature, scope, and terms
of a representation authority ... is of any concern to the other
party to the negotiations;"'" and (2) whether, once an employee
gives a union authority to negotiate, it can be revoked."8  In
Alliance, although the court found that many workers who had
authorized the union to represent them later changed their minds
as a result of the employer's lockouts and threats of lockouts,"
this pressure to repudiate the union's representation did not
violate section 57(1)(a). It also found that the employers'
conditioning signing the employment contract on the employees'
revoking the union's authorization to represent them was not
evidence of undue influence.189  Rather, the court held, the
.184. Id. at 998; see also Walter Grills, The Impact of the Employment Contracts Act on
Labour Law: Implications for Unions, 19 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 85, 91 (1994).
185. Alliance, [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 1008-09 (1991).
186. Id. at 1010.
187. Id. at 1011.
188. Id. at 1017.
189. Id. According to Chief Judge Goddard, the ECA required employers to respect
the employees' choice of representative:
Once the representative's authority is established and for so long as it continues
in force:
1. the employer must negotiate, if at all, with that representative;
2. the employer may not insist upon negotiating with the employees direct
or with some other representative;
3. the employer need not negotiate at all;
4. the employer may request or offer direct negotiation with employees;
5. the employer must not in so doing exert undue influence on the
representative not to act or to cease acting;
6. the employer must not exert undue influence in relation to any
employment issue on any person by reason of that person's association
(or lack of it) with employees.
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employer's pressuring employees to revoke their authorizations
showed that the employer recognized the union as represen-
tative.'19
One commentator, Walter Grills, concurred in the court's
refusal to find this a violation:
[W]hile an employer must remain neutral in respect to an
employee joining or not joining a union, the employer does not
have to remain neutral as to whether the employee utilises the
union as a representative in collective bargaining. Sections 6
and 7 are about membership in unions and clauses in contracts.
They do not prescribe how an employer should treat represen-
tatives of employees.'
9'
How can the ECA's protection of union membership,
grievance handling, and union office holding be reconciled with the
absence of protections against employer retaliation or coercion in
connection with employee authorization to represent? 92 The
dissonance appears even greater since union membership is well
protected, although it is of trivial importance under the ECA.
Authorization is unprotected, even though it is what makes the
exercise of most rights meaningful. Not protecting the act of
authorization means that even the most extreme action to thwart
authorization does not violate the ECA. This transforms
Alliance, [1992] 1 .R.N.Z. at 1033 (1991).
To the extent that these provisions appear to impose a duty to bargain, when read
together, they cancel or limit one another to such an extent that the obligations are
minimal and illusory. Id.
190. The Court of Appeals, in dictum, expressed serious reservations about the
Employment Court's decision to allow an employer to disregard the authority of a union
which had clearly established its authority to represent the employees. The Court of
Appeals said:
To go behind the union's back does not seem consistent with recognising its
authority. The contrary argument advanced for the employer here is that
authority can be recognized by trying to persuade the giver of the authority to
revoke it. That seems to me a rather cynical argument not necessarily in
accordance with the true intent, meaning, and spirit of the enactment. It would
apparently mean that, although employees had authorized a union to represent
them from the start, the employer need never negotiate with the union.
Certainly an employer is free not to negotiate with anyone; but if he wishes to
negotiate I doubt whether he can bypass an authorized representative.
Eketone v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.), Ltd.,' [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 779, 787 (C.A. 1992). -The
issue was moot and thus was not before the court so this statement was not binding.
191. Grills, supra note 184, at 91. The Court of Appeals held that employers are free
to express anti-union views. Such statements could become grounds for a finding of undue
influence, however, depending on the facts. Eketone, [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. at 786 (1992).
192. ILO REPORT, supra note 48, 1 13 7(g).
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authorization, the central right for employees who wish to
empower themselves, into a perilous act. This makes freedom of
association under the ECA little more than an empty rite.
This omission contrasts with the Wagner Act model where the
representative selection process is the focus of its prohibitions.
Although the NLRA gives an employer the right to express its
opposition to unions and unionization, 93 the employer cannot
threaten retaliation, discriminate, or commit other acts that render
representation futile. 94 That no comparable protections exist
under the ECA is primarily an expression of faith in the unitary
workplace. If, however, that faith is misplaced, the lack of similar
protections makes the system one of simple employer fiat.
The lack of support for employee freedom of choice belies the
ECA's claims in this matter. Not protecting authorization is more
detrimental to employees under the ECA than would be the case
under the NLRA. Not only is the ECA employer free to engage
in a wide range of conduct forbidden by the NLRA, it can engage
in more effective duress or retaliation because it knows which
employees to target. The ECA mandates disclosure of the
employees' choice of representative to the employer. Under the
NLRA, an employee either signs a card designating the union as
its representative, casts a secret ballot, or is hired into a unit that
already has an established representative. Nothing reveals the
individual employee's choice to the employer, so the employee is
free to choose. A system which binds individuals to the majority's
representation choice protects those workers who are afraid to
193. NLRA § 8(c). Professor Barenberg suggests that the first amendment would
permit broader time, place, manner restrictions on employer speech. Barenberg, supra
note 13.
194. Acts such as these would be violations of § 8(a)(1) or (3). Statements and other
actions that violate the NLRA include: threatening job loss or more onerous working
conditions; informing employees that seeking union representation will be futile;
humiliating employees; impliedly promising improvements in wages, hours, or other terms
or conditions of employment in order to dissuade them from supporting union; restricting
conversations; changing work rules because of union activity; or disciplining or otherwise
discriminating against employees for their union activities. See, e.g., Dayton Hudson Corp.,
316 N.L.R.B. 477 (1995). If serious enough to cause a union to lose support, such acts can
become the basis for ordering an employer to bargain with a union that a majority of the
employees supported. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969);
Flexsteel Industries, Inc. 316 N.L.R.B. 745 (1995). The NLRA even protects employees
from employer actions that are inherently destructive of their rights, without the need to
offer proof that this was the employer's purpose. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,
388 U.S. 26, 27 (1967).
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admit that they are union supporters.195 When nothing reveals
the employer's choice to the employer, the employee is freer to
exercise uncoerced choice.
The LRA, the legislation that preceded the ECA, protected
employees' choice in a way more akin to the NLRA. Maryanne
Street observed the contrast in employees' freedom of choice
under the LRA and ECA:
Such a freedom [to choose whether or not to belong to a
union] ignores the constraints which apply to the workplace in
terms of emotional pressure, fear of unwanted attention and
subtle victimisation. Although the existing legislation expressly
prohibited employers from exerting any undue influence on
workers with regard to union membership (LRA 1987 s.72(2)),
the law was in fact irrelevant either because of the dynamics of
the workplace or because of the worker's ignorance of it and
fundamental sense of powerlessness."
The LRA, however, provided a shield that protected
employees from having to disclose their views:
[I]n some sense I found members hid behind the legis -
lation. People who did want to be union members found it
difficult. They were largely women, largely nervous and
anxious, so for them having legislation meant that, well, of
course, I don't want to be a law-breaker, Mr. Employer, so I am
going to be a member. And this was really in small towns
where nobody could police it anyway.'"
The ECA, in contrast, requires workers to disclose their
preferences each time authorizations are given.' 9' Each act of
disclosure is dangerous, in part because authorization could be a
futile act. An employer may choose not to recognize the
employee's representative or to frustrate the bargaining
process.' Unions' resulting lack of access to the employees and
difficulty in meeting the ECA's procedural requirements leaves
them incapable of protecting the employee. Thus, although the
195. Maryann Street, The New Act's Effect on Low Paid Members, Address delivered
at the Longman Professional Conference, Auckland 5 (May 7-8, 1991); Interview with
Maxine Gay, supra note 67.
196. Street, supra note 195, at 5.
.197. Interview with Maxine Gay, supra note 67.
198. ECA § 12.
199. Street, supra note 195, at 7.
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ECA talks about choice, the LRA and NLRA have more
mechanisms to protect employees' choice.
If an employer has freedom not to associate with a union,
then what are the limits on its assertion of that freedom? The
ECA provides no answer aside from forbidding actions that
constitute procuring a contract "by harsh and oppressive behaviour
or by undue influence or duress."2" It is unclear whether the
courts will expand this prohibition to protect the process of
authorization where the legislature has been silent. This omission
represents the legislature's abdication of its obligation to make
policy choices when it had to know there would be constant
clashes between the exercises of freedom of association and choice.
Parliament made a policy choice, and that policy choice was to let
the market forces resolve the clash.
C. Representation Authority as a Procedural Hurdle
In 1994, the government told the investigative team from the
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association that an employee's
establishing authority to represent was "intended to ensure that
the individual's choice of representative is respected and that the
agent is genuinely representative of the employees. It also helps
to ensure that employees cannot be bound to agreements or
negotiations without their knowledge and against their
interests."2 °1 Although the ECA allows an employer to bargain
even with an entity not selected by its employees, the ECA places
a heavy burden of proof on a union to prove that it received valid
authorization to represent. This anomaly is difficult to reconcile.
On the one hand, the validity of authorizations means nothing in
the face of free choice, while on the other, requiring proof of valid
authorizations is a paternalistic hurdle that employers can use to
thwart free choice.
The government could have resolved the problem simply by
establishing a regular procedure, such as a government-conducted
election or check of authorizations to establish validity. When the
ECA was pending in Parliament, many urged the government to
include such procedures. Labour Party spokesperson for Labour
Helen Clark criticized the ECA's failure to specify how unions
were to establish representation authority as one of its most
200. ECA § 57(1)(a).
201; ILO REPORT, supra note 48, 11 193, 221.
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serious flaws. She predicted that this would provide ample work
for lawyers and the courts. 202  The Clerical Workers Union
(CWU) pointed out specific flaws: first, each worker had to give
his or her representative authority and then each worker also had
to be named as a party to a collective employment contract; and
second, the legislation failed to spell out how this authority was to
be given and its scope. The CWU lamented:
How is it obtained? Does it have to be in writing or can
it be verbal? Can it be given before negotiations start or do the
words in Clause 11(1)-"authority to represent that employee
or employer in those negotiations"-imply a specific authority for
each set of negotiations?
The vagueness of the phrase "authority to represent" has
major implications for Clause 11(2). It will make it easy for
employers to challenge the authority of representative they do
not want to negotiate with, for example by demanding evidence
of the authority given by each individual covered by the
contract.203
Employers, too, worried about the problems the legislation created
by failing to establish regular methods of representation. Carter
Holt Harvey recommended using majority votes to authorize
bargaining agents.2z Without such a procedure, Carter Holt
Harvey said, individual worker authorization would be chaotic,
ponderous, and frustrating.
205
These critics foresaw issues that have plagued unions and
employees by creating hurdles primarily in two areas: (1) in
bargaining and related actions; and (2) in legal proceedings to
prosecute violations of the ECA or breaches of contract.
202. See PARL. DEB. (Hansard) 1428 (Apr. 23, 1991) (N.Z.).
203. New Zealand Clerical Workers Union, Submission to the Labour Select
Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 17 (Feb. 1991). The union added, "The
more important point about Clause 11(2) is that the other party to negotiations merely has
to recognise a representative's authority. There is no requirement on employers to have
to negotiate or reach a settlement with the employees' chosen representative." Id. at 17.
The union characterized this situation not as providing freedom to negotiate but rather as
giving employers the right not to negotiate. Id. at 18.
204. Employees, however, would ratify individually by signing the resulting agreement.
Carter Holt Harvey, Ltd., supra note 98, at 13. Carter Holt Harvey's recommendation
may not have resolved some of the most fundamental problems with the ECA.
205. Id. at 16.
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1. Bargaining and Other Concerted Action
The requirement that a union prove it is an authorized
representative has created difficulties for unions and employees at
every turn.2 °6 The ECA, however, is equitable and may cause
employers equal trouble in some circumstances. The ECA made
any collective action difficult. In rare cases, this could create
problems for employers. One employer who wanted to lock out
its employees during a bargaining dispute found this was a difficult
task under the ECA. The 400 employees worked at sites scattered
throughout the country. The employer had to serve each
employee personally because none of the employees had
authorized anyone to receive lockout notices on their behalves.2"
Serving 400 employees is not easy, so the employer first tried to
evade this obligation. The employer first tried to served the
union," arguing unsuccessfully that the union's authorization for
negotiations also covered receiving notices.2"
The employer next gave its supervisors envelopes containing
written notices to distribute. The supervisors, in turn, attempted
to effect service by giving them to union delegates (stewards) to
distribute. In the words of Judge Goddard, "Now the delegates,
knowing that the last thing likely to be contained in the envelopes
would be good news, but suspecting in reality from all the
surrounding publicity that these would be lockout notices, refused
to have anything to do with them."21 In the end, the employer
mailed notices to each employee's home.2 1' By then the notices
were untimely, and the employer had to change the lockout
date.
2 12
Most often, however, authorization requirements create no
barriers to any employer action, while they create daily and
formidable hurdles for unions. These hurdles have been exacer-
bated in workplaces with high turnover or with a small number of
206. The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association also raised this concern. ILO
REPORT, supra note 48, 137(i).
207. New Zealand Merchant Service Guild IUOW v. New Zealand Rail, Ltd., [1994]
1 E.R.N.Z. 482, 486 (1994).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 488.
210. Id. at 486-87.
211. Id. at 487.
212. New Zealand Merchant Service Guild IUOW, [1994] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 489 (1994).
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workers at scattered locations. Authorizations had to be satisfac-
tory to the other party. This me~int that employers can, and do,
demand fresh authorizations and one which are specific to the
matter at issue.213 Roslyn Noonan explained how this affected
the NZEI, a large union spread throughout the country:
That has been terribly important because, under the
Employment Contracts Act, as you know, there are appallingly,
essentially irrelevant, but intended again to make a union's job
extremely difficult, there are technical requirements if you are
to bargain for people. It's not sufficient that people are
members and paying a subscription fee. We have to have
separate bargaining authorities from them and then within three
months of the negotiation starting, we have to get individually
signed ratification forms. It is just a nightmare task. Again, we
have done it, relatively speaking, incredibly well. But huge
resources have had to go into achieving that and it is still far
from perfect. We are in the process now of following up, so
lists are going out that say "These are the members and here's
our record of who signed bargaining authority. Here's our
record of who has signed ratification forms, and we need to fill
in the gaps."
Having to [get authorizations] say once, on an annual basis,
is probably a good thing but when you have to do it at least
twice, it's a huge effort. You have to have bargaining
authorities from them. Separate from that you have to have
ratification. You can do it together for people who are just
joining up. But, for the others, you can't because the
ratification forms can't be older then three months prior to
negotiations starting. The logistics of the whole exercise mean
that you need the bargaining authority forms, you need to be
getting them on a continuous basis. We now get them as we
join people, but like every other union, we had a huge existing
membership who had never signed specific bargaining authority
forms.
The employer can decide that ... the negotiations are
taking toq long and the bargaining authority forms are not
valid. The whole thing has been intended to make it as difficult
as possible for unions to operate and to giye employers any
excuse to deny recognition of the union when they want to do
that they can do it no matter how perfect you are, because it's
213. New World Supermarkets, for example, demanded proof of authorization at each
meeting. ILO REPORT, supra note 48, 1 157(c).
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impossible to be absolutely perfect in those situations. We try
to make the most of it, but I' have to say that the cost of the
whole process, individually to every member in terms of the
bargaining authority form. When you put 20,000 members ....
Let alone the envelopes, the cost of the labor for filling them
and the printing and so on. That money would be better spent
on members in other ways, but anyhow, we are committed to
doing whatever is required and in showing that we can and we
will, so the employers won't be able to use that as an excuse not
to deal with us.
214
Joris de Bres of the PSA.gave other examples of the difficul-
ties created if, during negotiations, it became necessary to strike:
They were then going to take us to court, questioning
whether we had in the form of the authorization that each
individual worker had to sign for us to represent them in
negotiations, whether that authorization also authorized us to
give notice of strike action. And as a precaution now we've had
to go to all our members and say, "Will you sign a further
authorization for us to serve notice of strike action?" It
becomes a huge procedural mess ....
With the fresh authorizations required at critical junctures,
employees are presented with yet another point when they must
positively reaffirm their commitment to the union (and inform
their employer of that fact) or decide to strike out on another
course, leaving the union without support when it most needs it.
Mere apathy or inadvertence can leave the union without valid
authority, just as can active opposition. Yet unions cannot refuse
to seek new authorizations, for they then would be illegitimate
representatives.
Some unions have searched, albeit unsuccessfully, for creative
ways to use authorizations as a Weapon. For example, in New
Zealand Meat Processors, Packers, Preservers, Freezing Works and
Related Trades Industrial Union of Workers v. Richmond216 the
employer sought "plant specific" collective employment contracts
(CECs). The union demanded a company-wide CEC. The
214. Interview with Roslyn Noonan, National Secretary, New Zealand Educational
Institute, in Wellington, N.Z. (May 26, 1992).
215. Interview with Joris de Bres, supra note 59.
216. New Zealand Meat Process IUOW v. Richmond, Ltd., [19921 3 E.R.N.Z. 294
(1992) (application for preliminary injunction); United Food Workers v. Talley, [1992] 3
E.R.N.Z. 643 (1991)(action for-permanent injunction and declaratory judgment).
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Employment Court, however, refused to limit bargaining to the
scope of the union's authorization. Instead, the court held that the
union had no power to act when the employer sought site specific
bargaining217 and that the employees retained the power to
bargain for site-specific CECs. This meant that the employer was
free to engage in direct dealing.218 The union's clever tactic left
it powerless to stop its members from signing site agreements.
219
By late November 1991, it had retained only one-third of its
members at one plant and only a few at the other.22 °
The PSA tried to avoid these problems by using the opposite
tactic when, on September 18, 1991, the Designpower agreement
expired.22 ' At that time, the employer wanted its employees on
individual employment contracts (IECs); by early 1992, however,
court interpretations of the ECA had made a. CEC more ad-
vantageous to the employer.222 By then, the union and its mem-
bers took the opposite view for the same reasons. 2 3  Workers
who had not yet agreed to the company's contract terms refused
217. United Food Workers, [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. at 720-21 (1992).
218. As Judge Palmer put it:
Confronted with this situation and the union's understandably unyielding
insistence, as it impressed me, that it was authorized only to negotiate a
company-wide collective employment contract, the defendant was plainly, I
conclude, lawfully entitled to approach its intended workers and negotiate
directly with them. What other choice, I rhetorically ask, did the company have
in the material circumstances?
Id. at 724.
219. See Rebecca Macfie, Employment Act Saps Strength From Union Muscle, NAT'L
Bus. REV., Oct. 18, 1991, at 24.
220. See Michael Turner, Meat Workers in Last-Ditch Stand Over Contracts, NAT'L Bus.
REV., Nov. 29, 1991, at 19.
221. New Zealand Public Service Ass'n, Inc. v. Designpower N.Z., Ltd., [1992] 1
E.R.N.Z. 669, 672 (1992). Designpower's parent corporation, Electricorp, or Electricity
Corporation, expressed views in support of the ECA that make an interesting backdrop
to events that occurred here. Electricorp stated that it viewed unions as having been
imposed contrary to the wishes of the employer and employees and as having "continuou-
sly placed obstacles in the Corporation's path in achieving its employee relations
objectives." Electricity Corporation, supra note 20, at 6. In addition, Electricorp said, the
ECA would not lead unscrupulous employers to exploit their workers. "The commercially
successful employer recognises the value of a skilled and well motivated workforce and
understands the role that fair and appropriate employment conditions play in maintaining
and motivating such a workforce." Id. at 7.
222. Certain court decisions had made it desirable, by that time, for employers at least
to say they were seeking CECs and employees and unions to prefer IECs. See Gilson &.
Dannin, supra note 5, at 10-12.
223. Designpower N.Z., Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 673 (1992).
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to negotiate collectively and informed the company that they had
withdrawn the PSA's authority to do so as well.224
Undaunted, the company wrote a memorandum to its
employees that it had received the revocations of authority as well
as employees' "pro forma letters" stating their preference for
IECs. The memorandum noted:
It is the company's current preference that you be a party to the
collective employment contract. This is a legitimate right the
company can exercise. Therefore you will need to give con-
sideration to nominating a bargaining agent to act on your
behalf, or alternatively represent yourself at those negotiations.
I will advise you of the date that collective negotiations will
commence and seek advice from you as to whom you wish to
act as your bargaining agent.
225
On April 6, the company warned its employees that they would be
locked out unless they began negotiations for a CEC.226  On
April 13, it followed through and locked out those who had not
signed agreements or given assurances that they would n-
egotiate. 217  Here again, the employer refused to deal with its
employees' representatives and forced its employees to deal with
it on its own terms.
22s
The PSA argued that the lockout violated section5(a) of the
ECA by transgressing employees' rights to "choose whether or not
224. Id. at 673-74; Jason Barber, Lockout Comes as Court Hears Union's Case,
DoMINION, Apr. 13, 1992, at 3.
225. Designpower N.Z., Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 686 (1992) (quoting Designpower's
March 5 memorandum). This statement promoted the purpose expressed in (d), which
"enables each employer to choose... [t]o negotiate or to elect to be bound by a collective
employment contract ... ;" but completely overrode the idea expressed in (c), which
"[e]nables each employee to choose either-(i) [t]o negotiate an individual employment
contract with his or her employer; or (ii) [tjo be bound by a collective employment
contract to which his or her employer is a party." Employment Contracts Bill (Long Title
of the ECA).
226. Designpower N.Z., Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 674 (1992). In its statement to
parliament when the ECA was pending, the employer argued that "any temptation to
perpetuate the view that protections are required based on the comparative strengths of
the parties to an employment contract should be avoided." Electricity Corporation, supra
note 20, at 8.
227. See Barber, supra note 60, at 3; see also Hawtin v. Skellerup Indus., [1992] 2
E.R.N.Z. 500 (1992).
228. But see Caledonian Cleaners & Caterers v. Hetariki, [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 400 (1994),
in which an employer was not allowed to terminate an employee who walked out of a
meeting. The employer had tried to negotiate directly with her, bypassing her represen-
tative. Id. at 404.
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to associate with other employees for the purpose of advancing the
employees' collective employment interests. 2 2 9  The court,
however, found that the employer's actions had no effect on
employees' rights to act collectively. Judge Colgan stated:
I am satisfied on an assessment of all of the evidence
presented that, as the defendant asserts, it is indifferent to
whether its relevant employees associate with others of them in
relation to the company's desire to negotiate a collective
employment contract .... I accept that Designpower is even
now indifferent as to how the negotiations for a collective
employment contract are to be conducted in the sense that its
coercion of employees has not been for the purpose of per-
suading them to associate with others of them to advance their
collective employment interests but has rather solely been to
coerce them into negotiations for a collective employment
contract.23°
As a result of this case, the level of unionization among
Designpower employees fell from eighty-eight percent to thirty-one
percent within four and a half years.231
The use of such a lockout would violate employees' NLRA
section 7 rights because it gives employees the right to refrain from
concerted activities.232 In addition, and more important, section
7 protects collective action. It understands "collective" in a more
natural sense than does the ECA. This result highlights the
disaggregated nature of bargaining under the ECA, which allowed
a CEC to result from individualized bargaining.
233
Although it may seem desirable to an employer to be able to
achieve this end, both employers and society must confront what
it means for an employer to have and to exercise this sort of
power. One New Zealand union representative observed:
229. Designpower N.Z., Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 678 (1992).
230. Id. at 683-84.
231. ILO REPORT, supra note 48, 154(b).
232. 29 U.S.C. §157 (1995).
233. The ECA provided that a decision as to the number and type of contracts in the
workplace was left to the parties. ECA § 18. This provision and the existence of CECs
and IECs multiplied grounds for disagreement, which the ECA resolved through strikes
or lockouts. One 12-page issue of Labour Notes reported five disputes in which the key
issue was conflict over the form of agreement. Cf. Tan, supra note 155, at 6; John
Maynard, Mobil Workers' Action Wins Right to Bargain Together, LAB. NOTES, Dec. 1994,
at 7; Pat Bolster, Drivers Thwart Push for IECs, LAB. NOTES, Dec. 1994, at 8; Grant
Cairncross, Housing Agency Fails to Purge PSA, LAB. NOTES, Dec. 1994, at 10; Lab Staff
and CHE in Court, LAB. NOTES, Dec. 1994, at 11.
1995]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
The general environment in most workplaces has moved
from one of fear and insecurity to one of cautious hopefulness
and sometimes even confidence that the worst is over. Com-
panies which in the last three years have used the Act as a tool
to reduce wages and conditions generally have low morale, low
levels of loyalty toward, and trust in the management, low job
satisfaction, and there also often exists amongst the workers
some sense that 'our time will come again,' be it by way of
regaining lost conditions or through finding alternative
employment and being able to escape.
As any industrial relations practitioner will tell you, the
history of a workplace is critical to its future. One wonders
what sort of future these organisations will be able to create
when so much ill will now exists because of what has occurred
under the ECA.2M
2. Court Proceedings
a. Union Standing to Bring a Lawsuit
On April 15, 1994, in the course of protracted contract
negotiations, Capital Coast Health wrote to its employees to
explain why it did not want their unions to be a party to the
contract:
The parties to the contract are Capital Coast Health and
the employees who indicate they wish to become a party.
While it is not unusual for a union to be a party to a collective
contract, the fact that there are at least four unions which may
have members coming under coverage of this contract, makes
this more difficult. Unions or other employee representatives
not being parties to this contract, does not prohibit your union
(or any other representative) helping you in enforcing the
contract should this be necessary. In effect the choice becomes
yours as to whom you want to act for you in any given
situation.235
In fact, this claim seriously misstated how difficult party and
authorization requirements could make contract enforcement or
any other legal proceeding to protect employees and their rights.
234. Suze Wilson, Organised Labour in the Employment Contracts Act Environment,
in LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND WORK IN NEW ZEALAND 1994, supra note 78, at 281,282.
235. New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union, Inc. v. Capital Coast Health,
Ltd., [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 936, 113 (1994).
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The plain truth is that unions face severe handicaps in
prosecuting ECA or contract violations, even of contracts the
union itself has negotiated. The structure of the law as it currently
exists and as unions operated under it in the past suggest that
party status will somehow obviate these problems and is thus
something worth making bargaining concessions to secure. For
example, the standing of a union, acting on its own behalf and
without specific employee authorization, to bring a case when it
was not a party to the contract, has been the focus of several
Employment Court cases.236 At this point the law is sufficiently
unclear as to what requirements a union must meet that a prudent
union will act in all cases as if it is not a party to an agreement.
A nonparty union safely can assume it can sue only as the
expressly authorized agent of a party3 7 or if given special per-
mission by the Employment Court. 3 8 The burden of establishing
the authority to represent another rests on the person asserting
it.
239
Some unions have tried to circumvent this problem by
developing creative arguments that union rights were directly
236. See, e.g., New Zealand Nurses Union v. Argyle Hosp., Ltd., [1992] 2 E.R.N.Z. 314,
344 (Empl. Trib. 1992) (nonparty union's ability to prosecute access issues as the sole party
raised by the employer but Mediator sidestepped the issue); Northern Distribution Union,
Inc. v. 3 Guys, Ltd., [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. 903, 916-18 (1992) (nonparty union has standing to
bring compliance action by language of § 55(2)). For problems involved in achieving
access .to court when a determined employer is opposed, see Adams v. Alliance Textiles
(N.Z.), Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982, 986-87 (1991). The union filed the case in its name
alone in order to protect the employees' identities. The court, however, required the
union to refile the statement of claim with the employees' names.
237. ECA §§ 45, 123(1)(b). In New Zealand Airline Pilots v. Mt. Cook, [1992] 3
E.R.N.Z. 355 (1992), the court found that the authorized union had standing based on
mutuality of interest with its members in bringing claims seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief and a compliance order, but not to bring a claim for a penalty under § 53(1)(a). Id.
at 405-07.
238. ECA § 123(3). In Prendergast v. Associated Stevedores Ltd., [1991] 1 E.R.N.Z.
737 (1991), the employer actively opposed the union's presence as plaintiff because it was
not a party to the employment contract and thus could not be affected by the alleged
violation. In that case, Judge Travis sidestepped this issue by allowing the union to be
made a party as a person entitled to be heard pursuant to § 90(2). Id. at 742. In New
Zealand Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Air New Zealand, Ltd., [1991] 1 E.R.N.Z. 880, 884-88
(1991), the employer argued that, because the employees were on individual contracts, no
resolution of the controversy would affect the union. The court reasoned that there was
a chain of contracts between the employer and employees and between the employees and
union. This meant that the union was affected to some degree. In the end, the court
allowed the union standing even though it was not a party to the contract in the case. Id.
239. ECA §§ 12, 59(3).
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violated, thus giving them standing to sue in their own right. In
one case, they argued that the employer's unilateral change in
working conditions prejudiced the union by making its members
lose confidence in it.2" In reply, the employer argued that
standing should be denied:
A breach which recognises prejudice to the union, where its
members are adversely affected by reason of the union loss of
bargaining strength or credibility with its membership, if it is
unable to enforce compliance, is no longer relevant under the
new Act, which abolishes compulsory unionism and the
exclusive negotiating rights of unions. No sufficient prejudicial
effect has been alleged."'
In that case, Service Workers Union of Aotearoa, Inc. v. Air New
Zealand, the court sidestepped this issue and that of the plaintiff
employee who did not sign a specific authorization for the union
to bring the case.242 Thus,. by refusing to face the issue of
standing, the court and tribunal allowed the union to bring the
case in the union's name. Despite the luck of some union-
plaintiffs, even a case involving collective rights or one to protect
workers who feared reprisals, might not give a union standing to
be a party.243
Events have shown that party status has limited value. All
unions, and not just nonparty unions, suffer severe disabilities in
trying to bring suit. Every time there is a violation of the contract,
the union must find signatories to the contract who are willing to
come forward as plaintiffs in order to bring suit. The union also
must secure authorization specific to the suit and then must prove
it has that specific bona fide authorization as a threshold issue.
Finally, employees must testify as to their damages or interest in
receiving a remedy in order to prevail.
Thus, if the union has party status and can join as a party, as
opposed to being merely the plaintiffs' representative, it still needs
240. Service Workers Union of Aotearoa, Inc. v. Air New Zealand, Ltd., [19911 3
E.R.N.Z. 503, 508 (1991); but see Northern Distribution Union, Inc. v. 3 Guys, Ltd., [1992]
3 E.R.N.Z. 903, 919-20 (1992). The court appeared willing to accept that a union could
claim standing for a compliance suit for breach of a contract, particularly when in
negotiations for a successor agreement. The negotiations gave the union both an interest
in the proceeding and standing.
241. Air New Zealand, [1991] 3 E.R.N.Z. at 508 (1991).
242. Id. at 512-13.
243. In this case, 32 employees joined as plaintiffs when the union refiled. Adams v.
Alliance Textiles, Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982, 986-87 (1991).
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employees to be parties and to give it authorization. Otherwise,
the union risks achieving only a pyrrhic victory in which it
nominally prevails but receives no relief because only employees
who have joined the lawsuit can secure a remedy.
The union's first problem of finding employees willing to join
the suit is not easy to overcome. Although employees risk being
denied a remedy by failing to join as a plaintiff, joining may not
always appear desirable to them. By becoming parties, employees
could be put at risk, particularly if the union loses. A loss may
then weaken employees' attachment to the union. In Alliance, for
example, the employer told the losing employee plaintiffs that it
would seek costs from them.
[O]nce they were individually named, and they lost, the
employer told them that they were going to seek costs of
$NZ100,000 [$59,000] and each one of those workers would be
individually liable to pay their personal share which would be
somewhere in the region of $NZ3,000 [$1,770], which is a hell
of a lot of money to a worker who's earning $NZ18,000
[$10,620] gross a year. And that the employer would deduct the
money out of their pay packets, because the employer was the
pay master ....
So the whole thing was an absolute disaster. After that
people just walked away in droves from the union. The union
lost a hell of lot of credibility through losing the case."
Even when fear of being assessed costs was not involved,
employees may be reluctant to reveal themselves, even as
subpoenaed witnesses, for fear of retaliation.
Cases involving large numbers of injured workers present
severe logistical problems. In Paul v. New Zealand Society for the
Intellectually Handicapped, Inc.,245 for example, the union had to
collect and submit authorizations from the 3500 workers employed
there before it could represent them in the lawsuit. The workers'
union memberships were irrelevant to this effort. Nor could the
union argue that it was highly unlikely that the workers would not
want representation in a situation where they had suffered clear
detriment. In the end, despite great diligence, the union could
244. Interview with Robyn Haultain, supra note 69.
245.' Paul v. N.Z. Soc'y for the Intellectually Handicapped, Inc., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 65
(1992).
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gather only 1040 authorizations by the court's deadline.2" In
addition to the problems of securing most authorizations, gathering
them for trial means the effort only can be made at the very time
the union is busy with preparation. Meanwhile, the employer is
free to focus on its trial preparations.
If this is not a sufficient burden, the judicial bodies have
interpreted the law to make securing authorizations, even of
willing employees, more onerous. The Employment Tribunal has
been especially zealous in creating new requirements and ad-
ditional burdens on unions trying to protect the rights of injured
workers. Unions have been required to submit fresh
authorizations. Even those given as little as nine months earlier
were deemed too stale to support a union's request for copies of
its members' IECs which are necessary to prosecute a court
case.
247
Unions could not try to anticipate all future needs by getting
general authorizations to cover any eventuality. The adjudicators
demanded that they be specific. Authorizations that stated that
the union was to act as the employees' "bargaining agent, and in
any other matter relating to our employment or employment
contract, including access to all employment contracts between us
and our employer" were held to be too broad 4.21 In Society for
the Intellectually Handicapped, Inc., the court wanted the
authorizations to state the name of the attorney.249  Such a
requirement made it impossible to use a general authorization or
even any authorization signed before trial was imminent. In
another case, the union presented general authorizations from
246. Id. at 69-70. The authorizations permitted the union's attorney to represent the
workers. The court's language suggests that it.wanted the authorizations to state the name
of the attorney, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, to gather them at any time
before trial. Id.
247. National Distribution Union, Inc. v. Foodstuffs (Auckland), Ltd., [199411 E.R.N.Z.
653, 660-63 (1994); New Zealand Baking Employees Union v. Foodtown Supermarkets,
Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z 266,272 (Empl. Trib. 1992). In this case, however, some employees
had specifically withdrawn those parts of their authorizations given for the purpose of
going to trial. Id. at 272.
When the ECA was enacted, some suggested that the ECA impose these very
requirements. Bill Manning, Rules Set for Bargaining Agents, NAT'L Bus. REV., May 21,
1991, at 9.
248. Foodtown Supermarkets, Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 270 (1992). According to the
mediator, section 19(6) permitted the employees to ask for their own contracts if they
wanted them. Id.
249. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 65, 68-70 (1992).
[Vol. 18:1
Bargaining Representation Under the ECA
members along with its rules, which said that financial membership
allowed the union's national executive to represent "financial
members in all negotiation and proceedings under the relevant
provisions of the Act" as evidence of its' authority to bring the
suit.25 The Tribunal held that ECA sections 59(3) and 90(1)(b)
created a "positive duty" to present specific authorities for specificlitigation."5
Thus, unions could try cases only if they exerted enormous
and continuous efforts. If an authorization was worded too
broadly with the intent of giving the union power to do any
necessary act, a more specific authorization was required. By the
time a union could anticipate and define every act it would need
to perform, the authorization would be too stale.
By September 1992, the court sent an ambiguous signal that
suggested it thought these requirements had gone too far when it
stated:
We wish to make it clear at once .... that there is nothing
to prevent an employer or employee signing a perfectly general
authority extending to future as well as to pending or imminent
action including litigation, but if the authority is to have this
effect, it must be plain from its terms that this was the intention
of the employer or employee signing the authority.
252
This statement was, however, dictum and thus not binding. In
addition, if the devil is in the details, then much depends on the
detail of how an employee's intent was to be established. Other
cases suggest this is yet another difficult burden to meet.
A union cannot bring a case until it proves that it has bona
253fide authorization. In Alliance, the court appeared ready to
250. Association of Salaried Medical Specialists v. State Serv. Comm'n, [1992] 2
E.R.N.Z. 625, 626 (Empl. Trib. 1992).
251. Id.
252. Foodtown Supermarkets, Ltd., [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. at 313 (1992). The court
suggested that it would still require an authorization's validity to depend on the events
contemplated by the principal at the time the employees signed the authorizations. Id. at
307.
253. ECA § 59(3) states: "Any person purporting to represent any employee or
employer shall establish that person's authority for that representation." On July 11, 1991,
less than one month after the ECA went into effect, the court issued the first judicial
interpretation of the ECA in Grant v. Superstrike Bowling Ctrs., Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z.
727 (1991). The second paragraph of the decision made clear how much had changed.
Judge Finnigan noted there that the applicant had properly authorized the New Zealand
Equity and Entertainment Union to represent her in this proceeding. Id. at 728; see also
Northern Local Gov't Officers Union, Inc. v. Auckland City, [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 1109, 1114-
1995]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
permit the union to prove this through signed statements without
having to call witnesses. As the case unfolded, however, it was
unclear whether this would have satisfied the court.2" Alliance
and later cases suggest that unions cannot avoid the requirement
of proving authorization. Because no one can be made a plaintiff
without consent and because the union was not a party, unions
must present competent evidence that they are authorized to bring
the case on the employee's behalf.
To sum up, the court's holdings have been, at best, erratic and
unpredictable. In some instances, it is clear from reading the cases
that the court is Willing to ignore fundamental evidentiary issues
with respect to authorizations, even while imposing other require-
ments.stringently. It will not allow the union's status as authorized
representative to be proven through the attorney's or union's tes-
timony. This comports with general rules of agency, that agency
cannot be proven through the agent's words. On the other hand,
as a reading of the cases cited in this section show, the court is wil-
ling to accept as proof of the representative's status, authorizations
that workers have signed, even when fundamental evidentiary
requirements are not met. First, whether oral or written, the
authorizations would be hearsay for this purpose. Second, if
authorizations constitute jurisdictional evidence, they must be
authenticated. Were any employer to refuse to . waive these
evidentiary objections, the court would be hard put to overrule the
objection. Although the court has not explained its willingness to
wink at these basic requirements, it is possible that the prospect of
having every worker who has signed or witnessed an authorization
undergo cross examination and impeachment would be more than
the court could bear.
On the other hand, the court has reinjected this problem by
requiring named plaintiffs to testify or face having the court
dismiss their cases.255 In addition, the court has limited remedies
to those who come forward to participate in the case. This means
that each employee who becomes a party or whose case was
dependent on proper authorization potentially must testify or risk
15 (1991) (setting out the terms of the authority in the opinion and noting that the contract
was signed by 394 out of 910 employees represented by the union in negotiations).
254. Adams v. Alliance Textiles, Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982, 989 (1991); see also Ward
v. Christchurch Transp., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 303, 308 (1992).
255. See Alliance, [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 988-89 (1991).
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dismissal of the case. Should an employer decide to challenge an
authorization on factual or evidentiary grounds, there would be no
way to evade these issues.
These problems are not really of the court's creation. The
ECA was written to include the authorization requirements, and
the court must apply that law. Employees can easily revoke their
authorizations. Therefore, the only way to be certain that any
authorization is valid and unrevoked is to require that these
elements be proved before the case can proceed. What this also
means is that workers affected by the litigation must be actively
involved with it. Courts would be remiss to allow cases to proceed
without .these workers' involvement. Although many judges have
been willing to evade problems of authorization, just as many have
not. The latter are the ones who are facing the unpleasant realities
of the infelicitous drafting of the ECA. They realize that just
because a union comes to court with a membership list does not
mean that the union actually represents anyone in the court
proceeding. The problem of fraud or authorizations which were
not what they purported to be was made all too clear in N.Z.
Dairy Workers Union v. Hautapu Whey Transport. The union
appeared as sole plaintiff and called no employees.2 56 The judge
adjourned the proceedings for two weeks and wrote the employees
to invite them to participate in the case.257 As it turned out, the
workers were technically members of the union but had not
authorized the union to bring the case. The workers then engaged
an attorney to represent them at the hearing, and the judge made
that attorney a party.
258
In most cases, we can assume that unions are authorized to
represent those they claim to. For these unions, not only can
finding, preparing and presenting all these witnesses be an
enormous hardship, the requiremerlts create other pitfalls. A
union fails to bear the costs and to secure employee witnesses at
the risk of losing the case of each such plaintiff or witness.
Moreover, the requirements demand more than merely presenting
witnesses. A union bears the burden of proof on these threshold
matters. If, as a prerequisite to suit, New Zealand unions must
256. N.Z. Dairy Workers Union, Inc. v. Hautapu Whey Transp., [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 549,
551 (1994).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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produce evidence to prove agency status, then this is an issue
which can be lost and which, if lost, can cause the entire case,
however meritorious, to be lost. The issue of authorization is not
technical but jurisdictional and nonwaivable.5
All this, of course, increases a union's costs of trying cases,
particularly one tried out of town. Robyn Haultain described the
witness costs involved in the Alliance case:
The case cost us $NZ60,000 [$35,400] to run in hotel bills and
feeding these workers and flying them up from Dunedin at
short notice. It cost $NZ60,000 [$35,400] in travel, accom-
modation and the food .... I work on a salary so if I hadn't
been doing it, I would have been doing something else. You
don't count my salary into it, but I had to be accommodated
down in Christchurch all the time. And that also includes, that
would include some of my preparation costs, my travel costs
flying down to Timaru and Dunedin to brief people's evidence
or to prepare their affidavits."
As long as unions have finite funds, they can try fewer cases under
these circumstances. Each trial risks depleting their resources and
increasing the chance they will be unable to protect other injured
individuals.26" '
Although we may think of procedural requirements as merely
a technical exercise or an exaltation of form over substance, what
is actually involved is. choosing winners and losers. It is, therefore,
important in imposing such requirements to consider how great a
burden they create and how useful they are to the ends of justice.
No evidence exists to suggest that Parliament considered these
issues in drafting the ECA or that courts have considered these
issues in interpreting it. All the requirements, however, operate
259. Paul v. N.Z. Soc'y for the Intellectually Handicapped, Inc., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 65,
69 (1991).
260. Interview with Robyn Haultain, supra note 69. The court refused to hold the
hearing at a location convenient to the witnesses, resulting in unnecessary cost increases.
I asked for the hearing to be heard in Oumaru, which is a place in-between
Timaru and Dunedin where we could have driven people backwards and
forwards each day. But Judge Goddard said that he wasn't sitting in some
crummy old district court chamber in Oumaru, and that if he had to sit on a
week-long hearing that Christchurch was as far south as he was going. So, yes,
so we had to fly people up.
Id.
261. In addition to these increased demands, unions also face greater uncertainty as to
sources of revenues and lost revenues. Wilson, supra note 234, at 283. The steep decline
in membership discussed above translates into less revenue.
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one way: to make it very hard for workers and unions to prevail
at trial. When the court procedures are placed in context with
other aspects of the ECA, it is clearly that plaintiffs will have
severely limited relief and many injuries will go without redress.
Take for example, courts' new demand that employees must
be willing to come forward. This means that employees who are
afraid to reveal themselves may forego a remedy. For example, in
the case of an employment contract obtained by duress, employees
may be aware that the onerous conditions of the new contract only
can be set aside if the employees join the suit. Employees who are
already feeling coerced are apt to be extremely reluctant case to
reveal themselves. In addition to this natural reluctance, the union
will have little ability in such a case to gain access to the
workplace. Intimidated employees need to feel they have a
protector, and employees in this situation will not have such
assurances.
The difficulty from the union point of view is that individual
employees do not wish to reveal their opposition to an aggres-
sive employer, particularly during times of high unemployment.
The difficulty for the Tribunal or the Court is that there is no
evidence either way. On the face of the Alliance case, the
workers may have been intimidated, or they may simply have
been happy with the collective contract.2 62
Thus, the ECA's requirements make it more likely that the normal
situation will be an employer's continuing to enjoy the fruits of a
serious violation.
The procedural problems also mean that the ECA permits,
and even encourages, inconsistent results depending on whether
and which employees become involved in a lawsuit. In United
Food Workers v. Talley, for example, the court found that the
employer had secured the contract through duress.2 63 The court,
however, would only set the contract aside for the eight employees
who had come forward.2" The other 306 employees who had
received the same treatment had no remedy and were left under
262. Grills, supra note 184, at 90. A secret ballot would permit employees to express
their preferences, free from employer knowledge. In the United States, some advocate
secret ballot elections so employees are protected from union pressure as well. See
Estreicher, supra note 106, at 41.
263. [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. at 456 (1992).
264. Id. at 457.
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the coerced contract terms. 265 This result although a loss on its
face, only can be regarded as a victory for the employer and a
serious problem for the rest of society.
Such a result, however, is not extraordinary or unusual under
the ECA. The ECA establishes a regime that refuses to accept
that the employment relationship is largely and inescapably
collectivized. It may be that ECA ideology cannot, and likely does
not want to, prevent the natural consequences of giving relief only
to those who testify and/or become party plaintiffs, that is, that
lawsuits will establish fundamental inconsistencies in workplace
terms. Although this result occasionally favors employers who will
thus avoid paying money to a large group of workers, in many
other instances, employers will chafe at the administrative and
personnel problems this result creates. Many workplace conditions
are similar to public goods, which cannot be set for one employee
only. 6 Indeed, many employers have expressed concern that
the ECA promotes inconsistent workplace terms.267
Employers and employees are not the only parties negatively
affected by inconsistencies connected with lawsuits. The legal
system, too, suffers when it is unable to foster its goals of efficien-
cy and integrity. Individualization of cases means having to
relitigate the same issue.26 One way to overcome this problem
265. id. at 456-58. In Alliance, the Court made it harder to try the case by refusing to
find duress from strong evidence of threats, lockouts, and other actions and opted instead
for direct testimony from the employees that they felt coerced. For further discussion of
this issue, see Dannin, Bargaining, supra note 5.
266. EDWARDS, supra note 41, at 60-61; Gottesman; supra note 6, at 77; Howard Wial,
Rethinking the Microeconomic Foundations of Worker Representation and Its Legal
Regulation: From Asset-Specificity to Collective Goods, Address delivered at the
Industrial Relations Research Association (Jan. 1995). On the other hand, as Finkin
points out, even in a unionized workplace, unions often bargain on a minority basis,
resulting in different terms and conditions. Finkin, supra.note 6, at 210-11.
267. EDWARDS, supra note 41, at 64-65.. Before enactment of the ECA, however,
employers saw different workplace conditions emerge from bargaining, not court action.
Some believed the ECA created "powerful incentives for employees to avoid a collective
employment contract and instead opt for identical individual employment contracts."
Chris Rennie, Union View Hard to Ignore, NAT'L Bus. REV., Feb. 28, 1991, at 2.
Employers worried that this would allow individual workers who occupied a critical
position within the firm to hold the employer's need for administrative certainty and
uniformity hostage to their demands. Patricia Herbert, Why Employers Fear the Birch Bill,
DOMINION, Mar. 21, 1991, at 12. This was an exaggerated fear because, if as few as two
employees agree to a collective employment contract, then those terms override any
inconsistent terms in individual contracts. ECA § 19(2).
268. The Talley court said, as to cases involving the interpretation "of many identical
individual employment contracts, or whether particular conduct constitutes a breach of
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and to make comprehensive, consistent, economical, and effective
action possible would be to permit class actions. Failing this, there
would have to be employers ready to concede defeat after losing
in an exemplar case.
The court, however, has foreclosed class actions in important
circumstances, such as cases involving contracts that were obtained
through harsh and oppressive means by finding that Section 57 of
the ECA expressly bars representative proceedings, and by too
easily finding that courts have found potential class members'
interests too diverse to find commonality.269 Furthermore, the
problem of obtaining authorizations also plagues class actions. A
union's inability to procure authorizations and explicit employee
support for litigation, may be evidence that a class action is inap-
propriate.27 ° Unless an employee's ability to rescind the union's
authority for representation is limited, class actions may not be
feasible. Such a complex lawsuit cannot be prosecuted if employ-
ees can withdraw or limit authorization at will and at any
point.271  Thus, class actions may not be available in cases
brought under the ECA as. a result of a mixture of legal and
practical impediments.272 It is also unlikely that employers will
such contracts, and the remedies sought are either declaratory or for a compliance order
or for a permanent injunction, then it would seem quite wrong that the Court should, by
refusing to treat the action as representative, allow the same issue to be litigated over and
over again with the same or different defenses to it being successively raised by the same
defendant." United Food Workers, [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. at 430 (1992). The court suggested
it might allow a union to use ECA § 123 to avoid this problem, even if not all employees
affected gave authorizations. Id.
269. Id. at 430. In Northern Local Government Officers Union, Inc. v. Auckland City,
[1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 1109 (1991), the court reasoned that a representative or class action
would be an appropriate way to proceed in a suit for injunctive and declaratory relief and
for a compliance order in a breach of contract case. It concluded, however, that only
those employees who had given the union an authorization to try the case would be
treated as parties. Id. at 1114-15. It is difficult to see how this fine line-drawing would
permit them to overcome the problems which led to Federal Rule Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)(A), (B).
270. United Food Workers, [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. at 431 (1992).
271. Cf. Ward v. Christchurch Transp., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 303, 306-08 (1992).
272. Grills, supra note 184, at 90. Similar problems may bedevil injunction cases. In
Hyndman v. Air New Zealand, Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 820, 826-27 (1991), the employer
argued that an injunction case could not be brought as a representative matter. Cf. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). In this case, two employees sought to represent 157 fellow employees.
The judge allowed this, based on an analogy to requirements under High Court rules,
although it was unclear whether they applied to cases brought under the ECA. Air New
Zealand, Ltd., [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. at 827 (1991). In this case, as well, the employer argued
that the union lacked standing to sue because it was not a party to the relevant agreement.
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readily concede defeat after a single exemplar case
is lost. As a consequence there may be no alternative
to multiple trials on the same or similar issue and
crowded court dockets.
IV. DISCUSSION
This Article began by juxtaposing the two models for ordering
labor relations: the Wagner and the ECA models. Proponents of
the ECA and LMC base their demands for change on the claim
that these are new systems designed to meet the needs of a
radically changed economy. This claim ignores all but the most
recent history of labor relations. This is not the first time that
these two models have been in conflict. The NLRA was preceded
by the shortlived section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act.273 This act had important parallels to the ECA. Its inade-
quacies were constantly in the minds of the congressional commit-
tee when it held hearings for the NLRA. A few years of experi-
ence under the regime section 7(a) established, made it easy to
recognize that its premises were unrealistic and that it did not
provide a suitable means for ordering labor relations.7
The tenor of the debate and the arguments then made closely
resemble today's discussion concerning the ECA/LMC model
versus the NLRA model. On the one hand, "[c]orporate
employers argued that labor's rights could be fulfilled through
employee representation plans (ERPs), that is, by a system of
works councils., 275 On the other hand, as one witness testified
sixty years ago:
True collective bargaining has certain essential qualities. It
requires certain conditions to be met. They are: (1) Freely
chosen representatives are to be recognized and dealt with for
the purpose of coming to an agreement; (2) representatives of
workers are to be chosen free from company domination; (3) no
means may be used to undermine the worker's organization;
and (4) agreements entered into are to be respected....
The judge decided to defer the question during the proceeding for interim injunction. Id.
at 827-28.
273. At the time of the NLRA enactment, approximately 3 million workers were
organized in company unions and 4.5 million in autonomous unions. Barenberg, supra
note 18, at 1386.
274. Id. at 1401-03.
275. Brody, supra note 7, at 37.
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Again and again cases have come before the National
Labor Board in which the employer flagrantly violated section
7(a) but took refuge in the claim that he observed the language
of the statute. He made the defense that he met, received, and
conferred with representatives of his employees. In one
extreme instance an employer came to the National Labor
Board and held that he had observed the law, although it was
clear that he has had no intention of coming to an
agreement.
276
The passage of sixty years can obscure the relevance of this
debate. First experience with the ECA is instructive for those in
the United States who now are considering promoting nonmajority
unions, enhanced LMC, and other changes as labor law re-
form.277 Each of these proposals is likely to suffer from the very
weaknesses that have rendered the ECA's system vulnerable to
abuse and incapable of fostering bargaining and the
democratization of the workplace. The value of studying the ECA
is twofold. First, it exposes its structural and distributional
weaknesses. Second, it reinforces the insight that the way law
interacts with society must be taken into consideration in crafting
a labor law. Pure theory will never lead to satisfactory results.
Those who crafted the NLRA had the benefit of seeing theory
crumble when placed into service.
The ECA is a new reminder of the weaknesses of pure theory
untempered by experience. As a result, we can benefit now from
the lessons it makes available. Allowing authorizations to be
revocable without limits establishes a preference for freedom of
choice that admits no room for stability.278  Requiring
authorizations that are fresh and specific also defeats stability and
the ability to provide effective representation. The ECA thus
demonstrates that labor law must provide some optimal level of
276. 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
1935, at 147 (1949) (testimony of Dr. Francis J. Haas).
277. For a discussion of these proposals, see Estreicher, supra note 106, at 43.
278. The NLRA resolved this problem through compromises such as the doctrine of
contract bar. Thus, when a collective bargaining agreement is in place, the union's
authority to represent the bargaining unit is presumed. At either the agreement's
expiration or, at a minimum, every three years, employees may vote to replace their
representative. See Appalachian Shale Products, 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958); see also St.
Mary's Hospital, 317 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Apr. 28, 1995). Contract bar and its allied doctrines
represent a counterweight to volatile change and implicitly embody a view that the
exercise of § 7 rights necessitates an ability to rely on the continuance of the relationship.
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stability to promote the interests of employers, employees, and
unions. Stability permits employers to plan for the future and
promotes peace in the workplace. It also enables unions to be the
means for empowering workers so they can be full partners in
codetermining workplace conditions. That optimal level of
stability only can be achieved if the law protects 'the status of the
bargaining representative, provides regular processes for achieving
that status, and fosters an acknowledged and'a clearly defined
status for the representative. Although one side may rejoice that
it has prevailed under a chaotic system, that victory is likely to be
unstable in turn. Fundamental components of society should not
function chaotically. Chaos will exist unless workers can designate
a representative with the power to co-determine workplace
conditions. This important insight that the Wagner Act expresses
is as true today as it was then.
A second important insight is that legislation may have a
negative impact on unions, even if the legislation is not inten-
tionally anti-union. Nothing in the ECA seems anti-union in the
commonly accepted sense of the concept; nonetheless, it has been
destructive to unions and collectivity. The reason it has had this
effect is that it fails to appreciate and support the value of collec-
tivity for workers. Furthermore, it fails to consider the context in
which the law would operate. This latter problem meant that it
tried to treat as like things that are unalike. As a consequence,
the ECA shapes and restricts power relationships, and these
reconfigured power relationships then act upon unions.279
These tendencies come together under the ECA in the
dissimilar ways that the law applied to workers and employers.
The ECA accepted corporations as so natural and unassailable a
feature of modern society that its proponents failed to notice that
corporations are artificial creatures, wholly dependent upon law to
-sustain their collective existence.' Although it did not see this
"mote in the eye" of corporations, the ECA certainly took notice
in the case of unions. All legislated supports for collectivity were
taken from them. ECA supporters then used unions' failure to
thrive under the new conditions as evidence that they were
279. Atleson, supra note 82, at 473 n.30.
280. Electricity Corp., supra note 20.
[Vol. 18:1
Bargaining Representation Under the ECA
unnatural and unnecessary.281 It takes little thought to realize
that no corporation could survive a similar test.
In a sense, the ECA regime has subjected unions to the same
impossible standards that women faced during the Salem witch
trials. If the accused women could swim when thrown into the
pond, this constituted unassailable proof they were witches to be
burned at the stake. If they drowned, they were not witches and
could take comfort knowing their immortal souls were not in peril.
At the same time, there were others who, by virtue of the
structures of the community, would never be subjected to these
unwinnable tests and who could use the witches' fate to prove the
illegitimacy of those who failed and re-affirm the community's
need for their services. So, too, ECA proponents ignored the
inconvenient realities of the law's operation as they used its impact
to further their goals.
The ECA also ignores key differences in purposes and roles
that different institutions fill- in society, demanding that all be
equally exposed to market forces. The campaign for the ECA has
promoted materialism and acquisitiveness as yardsticks which may
be used to measure all success or failure. Institutions not motivat-
ed by these goods cannot fare well in an ECA regime. Thus, a
veneer of legislative equality and ideologically driven agendas
hides the ECA's inherent and pervasive inequality and incompati-
bility with the needs of the workplace and society to the extent
they are based in other values. This veneer also hides the fact that
the ECA's drafting bolsters the employer's position in all but the
most unusual situations.
The drafters' adoption of ideology as the lodestar for
constructing the legislation allowed them to avoid the difficult
procedural issues that good drafting would have resolved. The
drafters refused to create a method for making rights meaningful,
such as providing adequate protections or providing a method for
ascertaining rights.282 Instead, they justified these inadequacies
by claiming that the market was the appropriate way to resolve all
disputes and that using other methods of resolution would have
disastrous consequences. "By making the riesult seem necessary,
unavoidable, rather than chosen, [they attempted] to convert what
281. Id.
282. ECA § 3.
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is tragically chosen into what is merely a fatal misfortune., 283
This was an abdication of responsibility, which ultimately only
shifted the job of making the ECA function to the courts. When
disputes came to the Employment Court, the Judges became
accountable for resolving any ambiguity or lacunae. This quasi-
religious belief in the market assumes that the market "exists
independent of legal regulation and public policy.' '2 4  Thus,
ideology provided its drafters with ready excuses for foisting a
highly flawed law on New Zealand.'
The ECA experiment thus teaches that ideological purity as
a goal is a poor tool in drafting legislation. Although the ECA's
proponents saw the act as a way to promote their goals of
freedom, self-actualization, and productivity, its operation
demonstrates that these goals are not fully compatible in the
current ECA design. Its drafters abdicated the responsibility of
making hard decisions where the espoused goals were in conflict,
preferring to leave these decisions to the market forces. Substan-
tial evidence exists that the ECA has not achieved even the goals
its proponents advocated as a result of their abdication of
responsibility. This is especially true when there is no restriction
on an employer's achieving its productivity goals through wage
cutting and where the union is marginalized and cannot help the
employees collectivize to take an active role in the workplace.285
On the other hand, ECA proponents have been able to
achieve their goal of marginalizing unions. A union officer
observed that some employers and employees have come to regard
unions as
283. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBi, TRAGIC CHOICES: THE CONFLICTS SOCIETY
CONFRONTS IN THE ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES 21 (1978).
284. Atleson, supra note 82, at 484. The ECA identifies both its end and its means to
the end as freedom of contract and of the market. The unreflective conflation of means
and ends itself may be a problem in the process of legislating. Cf RICHARD LEMPERT &
JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESERT, DISPUTES,
AND DISTRIBUTION 280, 282 (1986).
285. Wilson, supra note 234, at 282. That this should be the case is not surprising if one
looks at.the campaign for the ECA. Many of the NZBR leaders had argued for the need
to provide new job entrants with "training wages." See Dannin, Labor Law Reform, supra
note 4, at 18 n.82. Penelope Brook, a leading ECA proponent, condemned the pre-ECA
system for having "little room to adjust negotiated awards downwards." Brook, supra note
25, at 187, 198-99, 201-03; Brook also argued that the ECA would induce employers to
raise their workforce's skill levels. Id. at 197.
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outside forces whose role is to advise workers on their legal
rights and obligations at the time of negotiation or during
disciplinary proceedings but which otherwise have no role to
play in the workplace. In some places this "outside influence"
is regarded positively, but is still nonetheless seen as coming
from "outside". Very few companies see themselves as being
in a long-term, strategic partnership with their employees and
their union.2"
New Zealand's treatment of authorizations to bargain and of
unions thus begs the question whether a society is better or worse
off when workers are deprived of a meaningful collective
voice.287 Issues affecting the existence of unions and their ability
to serve their members bear directly on this question.
The ECA did not intend its treatment of authorizations to
represent to be an answer to that question. Nonetheless, it
accorded unions so little value and created so many hurdles to
union organization and effective action that there is no doubt what
the ECA's answer is. Joris de Bres of the PSA observed:
I think the things that essentially at the end of the day hit
us most and that we didn't predict are the removal of any
reference to unions, any rights for unions, the total premise of
individualism and then the critically complex procedures to
recollectivise as individuals without any assistance from the law.
In other words, even in the area of getting authorizations,
getting negotiations, being able to negotiate and initiate
industrial action while a contract is still in force and for the
contract to continue after its expiry date. Those are the things
we thought would stay and they haven't. So at the end of the
day the key things for us are a major difficulty in getting an
effective relationship between the employer and the union on
an enterprise basis, because any bit of the union work,. if you
like, any group of workers can opt out of that process.
28
286. Wilson, supra note 234, at 281-82. A similar phenomenon occurred in the United
States. A large number of nonunion workers say they will not join a union because of
company pressures. Atleson, supra note 82, at 477. Lowell Turner observed a similar
dynamic. In a period of work reorganization, either an employee's representative must be
integrated into managerial decision-making or must be marginalized. LOWELL TURNER,
DEMOCRACY AT WORK: CHANGING WORLD MARKETS AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR
UNIONS 125 (1991).
287. Estreicher, Labor Law Reform, supra note 24, at 30.
288. Interview with Joris de Bres, supra note 59.
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Thus, although the ECA began from a premise of equality, it
created imbalance and inequality. Its explicit lack of structure
created a route that inevitably led to drastically altered power
relationships.
Manuka Henare has answered the question of what values
society should foster by concluding that the ECA's functional and.
social values, as embodiments of neo-utilitarianism, are incom-
patible with Maori metaphysical and ethical principles:
It would not surprise me if a Maori claim will soon be
lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal against the Crown. Articles
2 and 4 of Te Tiriti o Waitangi [The Waitangi Treaty] guarantee
that Maori can exercise their tino rangatiratanga [sovereignty]
over their lives and work, and that ritenga Maori, customary
beliefs and practices, cannot be upheld in the employment
context would be an interesting test of the ethics and values
embodied in the ECA.289
The ECA's rejection of community for individual ends has not
brought about the productive society it envisioned as the necessary
accompaniment of a system fully open to market forces. The ECA
may, in the long term, actually destroy New Zealand's ability to be
a competitive modern society because its enterprise agreements
make it difficult to promote .important social ends, such as industry
training. A single employer cannot afford to risk investing in
training for fear that its employees then will be more marketable
and leave.2" The loss of negotiating on a broader scale than the
single enterprise is leading to a gradual loss of skills. The number
of New Zealand enterprises failing to address training, quality
improvement, or other workplace reforms grew from 1992 to 1993.
In 1993, fifty-one percent of enterprises employing forty-eight
percent of workers fell into this category, sharply up from forty-
one percent of enterprises and thirty-three percent of employees
the year before.291  In 1993, only twenty-four percent of
enterprises employing twenty-nine percent of employees had met
289. Manuka Henare, Human Labour as a Commodity-A ,Maori Ethical Response, in
LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND WORK IN NEW ZEALAND 1994, supra note 78, at 214, 220.
290. High turnover, or the risk of it, inhibits employer training and tends to lead to an
undertrained workforce. Paul Osterman, Pressures and Prospects for Employment Security
in the United States, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, supra note 3, at 228, 233.
291. Richard Whatman et al., Labour Market Adjustment Under the Employment
Contracts Act, 19 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 53, 70 (1994).
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the gap by increasing provisions promoting training.2 92 Enter-
prise and individual bargaining have encouraged employers to use
short term methods to improve their positions, such as wage
cutting.
Many ECA proponents argued for the need to provide new
job entrants with "training wages., 293 The phrasing suggests that
those who would receive these low wages would then move on to
jobs offering living wages. Experience has shown, however, that
there are groups of people who will never move away from those
unskilled jobs.2' A system that permits or even supports unilat-
eral employer wage setting means that members of those groups
will be unable to find work that provides sufficient means of
support and thus ultimately leaves them on the fringes of society.
There is an important practical and moral question here: whether
a society can and wishes to condemn a portion of itself to a life of
poverty.
There is little that is positive in the ECA story. One poten-
tially optimistic note for unions is that, where unions have hung
on, the ECA resolves once and for all the question of unions as
outsiders. The ECA has the potential to force workers to develop
a heightened consciousness of the value of unions as their
protectors; whereas, under the prior system, the award system
protected workers from any change in their wages whether or not
they were members of the union. In other words, the ECA
removed incentives to be a free rider.2 95 Furthermore, the ECA
removed any arguments that unions were "third parties." After
the ECA, any union in the workplace existed because workers had
freely chosen the union, often at great cost. Thus, the ECA
helped move the union position as representative to a much higher
moral ground.
V. CONCLUSION
For better or worse, the ECA, as it currently operates, is
likely to generate cynicism as it fails to fulfill its promise of
292. Id. at 70.
293. See Dannin, Labor Law Reform, supra note 4.
294. Brian Easton, The Maori in the Labour Force, in LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND
WORK IN NEW ZEALAND 1994, supra note 78, at 206, 211-12.
295. Patricia Herbert, Workers Stick Close to Union's Petticoats, DOMINION, June 19,
1991, at 12.
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freedom to employees. A similarly unkept promise in NIRA
section 7(a), however, caused such unrest and pressure that the
legislature eventually was forced to enact the NLRA.296 Illusory
rights break faith with the public's sense of law as a moral
force.297 On all important standards for measurement, the ECA
has been a failure.298 Its failures, however, enable us to see what
changes are needed to provide true collective bargaining for New
Zealand workers. Just as the failure of NIRA section 7(a) helped
the NLRA's drafters see those areas requiring attention and
protection, so, too, the ECA's shortcomings provide us with new
information as to the processes of labor law reform.
296. Barenberg, supra nole 18, at 1437.
297. EDWARDS, supra note 41, at 103-04.
298. It also appears to have failed in terms of its stated economic goals. For a
discussion of these goals, see Dannin, A Case Study, supra note 4.
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